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Abstract
By considering what we identify as a problem inherent in the ‘nature of the firm’—the risk of abuse of authority—we pro-
pound the conception of a social contract theory of the firm which is truly Rawlsian in its inspiration. Hence, we link the 
social contract theory of the firm (justice at firm’s level) with the general theory of justice (justice at society’s level). Through 
this path, we enter the debate about whether firms can be part of Rawlsian theory of justice showing that corporate govern-
ance principles enter the “basic structure.” Finally, we concur with Sen’s aim to broaden the realm of social justice beyond 
what he calls the ‘transcendental institutional perfectionism’ of Rawls’ theory. We maintain the contractarian approach to 
justice but introduce Sen’s capability concept as an element of the constitutional and post-constitutional contract model of 
institutions with special reference to corporate governance. Accordingly, rights over primary goods and capabilities are 
(constitutionally) granted by the basic institutions of society, but many capabilities have to be turned into the functionings of 
many stakeholders through the operation of firms understood as post-constitutional institutional domains. The constitutional 
contract on the distribution of primary goods and capabilities should then shape the principles of corporate governance so that 
at post-constitutional level anyone may achieve her/his functionings in the corporate domain by exercising such capabilities. 
In the absence of such a condition, post-constitutional contracts would distort the process that descends from constitutional 
rights and capabilities toward social outcomes.
Keywords Basic structure · Capabilities approach · Corporate social responsibility · Corporate governance · Entitlements 
and legal rights · Theory of the firm · Rawlsian theory of justice · Nash bargaining solution · Sen · Social contract
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Introduction
The Social Contract (SC hereafter) approach constitutes a 
considerable line of thought in business ethics (Donaldson 
1982; Keeley 1988, 1995; Freeman and Evan 1993; Dunfe 
and Donaldson 1995; Donaldson and Dunfee 1994; Sacconi 
2000, 2006a, b, 2007; Heugens et al. 2006; Bishop 2008; 
Hsieh 2005, 2009). Nevertheless, some recent contribu-
tions, based on an analytical reconstruction of classic works 
in SC philosophy and, eminently, Rawls’ Theory of Justice 
(TJ, hereafter), have forcefully asserted that the firm is not 
amenable to a SC analysis and justification. In particular, the 
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Rawlsian TJ—because it is a theory of political institutions—
could not provide a basis for understanding and justifying 
corporate governance (Mansell 2015; Singer 2015, 2016). 
According to this view, corporations do not enter the domains 
of the SC and TJ, and hence such theories are not appropri-
ate for providing a theoretical framework to business ethics.
We do not intend here to undertake analysis of these criti-
cal arguments, or to engage in a direct confutation of them. 
Moreover, it is not our aim to enter a scholastic discussion 
about what Rawls (or any other classical SC theorist) ‘really 
said’ about the corporation—a subject that certainly was not 
central to A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971). Even if Rawls 
had excluded the corporation from its domain, we would 
still think that there is a logical necessity for a SC theory of 
the firm (SCTF hereafter) and for studying its integration 
into the conception of justice in general. The first aim of 
this paper is hence to pose the problem in its most fruitful 
perspective, i.e., to ask the following questions: what is the 
internal logical necessity emerging from the economic anal-
ysis of the firm? By viewing the firm as an economic institu-
tion can we (or not) recognize the need for a SC theory? Has 
(or not) such a theory been provided to date? Is (or not) the 
logic of such a theory ‘Rawlsian’? To all these questions, 
we shall answer positively. Then, once we have recognized 
that a ‘Rawlsian’ theory of the firm is not only needed, but 
at least in its general outline is already in place, we will also 
ask whether can it find room in the original formulation of 
the TJ as provided by Rawls himself, a question that we shall 
also answer positively.
More specifically, our starting point is a critical assess-
ment of the new institutional economic theory of the firm 
(NIE hereinafter)—the best account that modern economics 
has given of corporations. Hence, by considering what we 
identify as a problem inherent in the ‘nature of the firm’ 
we make the case for the SCTF, which is truly Rawlsian 
in its inspiration (Sacconi 2000, 2006a, b, 2011a, b). We 
then link the SCTF (justice at the level of the firm) with 
the constitutional choice of the basic institutions of society 
that are the subject of the TJ (justice at the level of society). 
This leads us to consider how TJ can include the domain of 
corporate governance (CG hereafter). In fact, this relation 
still needs to be clarified given the apparently different loca-
tions of firms and the constitution respectively in the ‘logi-
cal map’ of the TJ, and especially the distinction between 
‘the basic structure’ and institutions that do not belong to it 
directly. Although Rawls himself did not include corpora-
tions in the basic institutions of society, we propound the 
view of firms as institutions whose governance principles 
must be included in the constitutional design of society (i.e., 
the “basic structure”).
This introduces only the first part of our contribution. 
What is most original about this article, in fact, is that we 
concur with Sen’s aim to broaden the realm of the idea of 
social justice beyond what he calls the ‘transcendental insti-
tutional perfectionism’ of Rawls’ theory (Sen 2009). Con-
sequently, we further enlarge our ‘Rawlsian’ view of CG 
via Sen’s capability concept (Sen 1992, 2009) by providing 
additional suggestions for capabilities’ applications in the 
business domain.1 We maintain that rights over not only 
primary goods but also capabilities are (constitutionally) 
granted by the ‘constitutional agreement’ on the basic insti-
tutions of society. However, our focus is on the application 
of the capability approach (CA hereafter) to CG, as firms 
are post-constitutional institutions wherein stakeholders 
may turn capabilities into functionings. Examples are the 
achievement of a high level of functionings (and hence eude-
monic happiness) in professional life, but also the achieve-
ment of basic functionings as in the case of an employee 
earning an income, health and social insurance, self-control 
and self-esteem. Such transformation processes are deeply 
affected by incomplete contracts and authority relations 
that shape the entire set of decision rights within the firm. 
Therefore, we argue that the SC, understood as the distribu-
tion of rights on primary goods and capabilities, granted at 
the constitutional level, should shape the principles of CG 
so that at the post-constitutional level anyone can achieve 
her/his relevant functionings in the corporate domain. This 
means that all the individuals participating rationally and 
responsibly in the firm, within the constraints posed by a 
structure of rights upholding anyone’s capabilities, are ena-
bled to attain their functionings in correspondence with their 
chosen capabilities and hence to reach a state of well-being. 
Lacking such a condition, post-constitutional contracts on 
the formation of various corporate organizations would dis-
tort the process that descends from constitutional rights and 
capabilities toward social outcomes.
Summing up, this paper contributes to the existing 
debates in three main respects. Its first contribution is to 
make the point about the existence of a SCTF, which is truly 
Rawlsian in its inspiration. The second is to link the SCTF 
(justice at the level of the firm) with the constitutional design 
at the level of society in general (Rawls’ TJ). The third con-
tribution is to further enlarge our ‘Rawlsian’ view of CG via 
Sen’s capability concept.
Our argument progressively generalizes from the particu-
lar case of the firm (a particular institution) to the middle 
level analysis of how a constitutional contract would set-
tle the special matter of CG, until reaching the even more 
abstract subject of the full integration of CG principles into 
1 Sen would not accept being considered a contractarian. However, 
Nussbaum already established connections between the CA and a 
Rawlsian perspective on constitutional choice, by suggesting that 
basic capabilities would be identified as the subjects of ‘overlapping 
censuses’ in a constitutional agreement worked out through the public 
use of reason (Nussbaum 2011, pp. 89–93).
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the TJ in general. A brief description of the paper’s struc-
ture follows. Starting from the firm, Sect. “New-Institutional 
Economic Theory of the Firm and the Need for a Multi-
stakeholder Governance Model” maintains that abuse of 
authority in the presence of multilateral specific investments 
is an unsolved problem inherent in the nature of the firm as 
seen through the lens of NIE. This invites a first considera-
tion of the corporation’s governance arrangement in light of 
the idea of justice, which suggests basing it on the SC among 
all the firms’ stakeholders. Section “From the Micro-social 
Contract of the Firm to a Rawlsian Constitutional Contract” 
presents three subsequent models in the SCTF whereby CG 
enters the constitutional and post-constitutional design of 
economic institutions and we prove that the constitutional 
contract on CG can be designed from a truly Rawlsian per-
spective (see Appendix 1 on why Utilitarianism does not 
provide an equally satisfactory justification for the stake-
holder approach). Section “Corporate Governance & Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice” enters the debate about whether firms can 
be part of the Rawlsian TJ in general; in consequence of the 
previous analysis, we show that CG principles are entitled 
to be considered part of the “basic structure.” Section “Sen’s 
Capabilities Approach and the Corporate Domain” consti-
tutes the more innovative part of the paper and proposes an 
enlargement of the SCTF by showing how Sen’s capabilities 
concept shapes CG (but see Appendix 2 for a clarification of 
why a capabilities metric is more fruitful for our subject than 
a resource-based metric). We provide here a new analysis of 
two meanings of capabilities as ‘skills’ and ‘entitlements’ 
and clarify how entitlements can be understood by means of 
a rigorous analysis of legal entitlements as freedom, positive 
and negative claim-rights. Then we interpret these entitle-
ments as part of a CG design, pointing out how the capa-
bilities of stakeholders (and employees in particular, but see 
Appendix 3 for an extension to customers) in the domain of 
CG constrain the notion of ownership of the firm. Section 
“Institutional Complementarities, and the Failure of Well-
Being and Justice,” finally, addresses the ‘complementarity’ 
among institutions at different levels in securing the aims of 
well-being and justice, and suggests the “Penelope’s canvas 
paradox” to evidence what happens if CG and the institu-
tions subjected to social justice are not integrated. The paper 
ends with the section “Conclusion”.
New‑Institutional Economic 
Theory of the Firm and the Need 
for a Multi‑stakeholder Governance Model
Hierarchies and the Abuse of Authority Problem
In NIE, rooted in Coase’s seminal work on the nature of 
the firm (1937) and developed through the concept of 
transaction cost minimization, the firm is defined as a uni-
fied mode of governance of transactions and represents an 
alternative to the coordination of transactions in the market. 
Roughly, firms emerge when the cost of using the market is 
greater than the cost of internal bureaucracy (i.e., authority 
relations).2 Developing this approach, Williamson (1975, 
1986) introduced the concepts of ‘contract incompleteness’, 
‘opportunism’ and ‘specific investments’ that characterize 
the resources employed in a transaction. Accordingly, when 
contracts are incomplete, and in the presence of specific 
investments, opportunistic behavior can affect the distribu-
tion of value among the parties by exploiting the unilateral 
or mutual dependence that investments create in their (idi-
osyncratic) relationships (Williamson 1986). Under these 
assumptions, transactions are doomed to failure in terms 
of efficiency losses (essentially due to the anticipation of 
the possibility of unfair treatment between contractual par-
ties). In order to achieve a mutually beneficial exchange, 
the normative solution proposed by NIE (Williamson 1975, 
1986; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 
1995) hence suggests a mechanism based on the allocation 
of authority (or internal hierarchy). Authority is here under-
stood as the right to decide on matters not covered by the 
ex-ante contract (residual rights of control) and it affects the 
distribution of the jointly produced value. A party endowed 
with authority is able to obtain the execution of the ex-ante 
un-contractible decision that s/he prefers, but it must be car-
ried out by the subordinate counterparty, essentially thanks 
to a (legitimate) threat of exclusion of this party supported 
by ownership of the firm. The normative solution proposed 
by NIE is then a ‘unilateral hierarchical solution’ in which 
authority is assigned to the person who makes the specific 
investment in order to maintain her/his incentives to invest. 
In fact, the non-controlling parties cannot make opportunis-
tic threats to renegotiate the contract insofar as the control-
ling party, holding residual control rights, can dictate by fiat 
the disagreement outcome.
However, when specific investments are multiple and 
interdependent, one-side control will not prevent the risk 
of ‘abuse of authority’ (Sacconi 1999, 2000, 2011a). The 
individual (or class of individuals) who has the authority 
may protect her/his investment from expropriation, but at 
the same time may ‘legally’ expropriate other parties’ invest-
ments by appropriating all the corporate surplus also deriv-
ing (by means of joint production) from other stakeholders’ 
investments. The unilateral hierarchical solution is a ‘second 
best solution’ because it causes an inefficient outcome in 
terms of under-investment by the party that lacks authority 
2 Further seminal contributions to the analysis of the firm as essen-
tially based on authority relations are Simon (1951) and Arrow 
(1974).
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and over-investment by the party that holds authority (Gross-
man and Hart 1986). But such inefficiency essentially boils 
down to expected unfairness and hence the fear of abuse of 
authority. Therefore, the risk of injustice—a threat to the 
legitimacy of authority in the corporate domain—is inher-
ent in the unilateral solution of authority allocation (Sacconi 
1999).
The problem persists under analyses of the different pos-
sible ownership structures of the firm that are apparently 
aware that each solution should account for the interest 
(minimizing contracting and governance costs) of many 
stakeholders (Hansmann 1988, 1996). However, the solu-
tion is still unilateral: taking each stakeholder’s contract 
costs as given, it prescribes the allocation of authority to 
the particular stakeholder class that by exercising it mini-
mizes (its) governance costs. But a stakeholder category’s 
contracting costs normally depend on the unilateral exer-
cise of authority by another stakeholder category. Thus, this 
solution leaves substantial contract costs to be shouldered 
by non-controlling stakeholders essentially because of the 
abuse of authority of the controlling one (e.g., in the case 
of capital investors’ control, contract costs borne by human 
capital investors, i.e., employees). Such ownership structures 
lack legitimacy and hence are normatively unjustified and 
tend to be unstable (and to reach suboptimal equilibria). A 
need for a multi-stakeholder approach to CG hence directly 
ensues from the internal criticism of NIE.
The Multi‑stakeholder Model of CG
In the perspective joining NIE (Williamson 1975, 1986; 
Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995) 
with the stakeholder approach (see Freeman 1984), the firm 
appears as team production among holders of specific invest-
ments, with some other stakeholders potentially subject to 
the (negative or positive) externalities deriving from it (Blair 
and Stout 1999; Sacconi 2000, 2006a, 2011a). The abuse of 
authority in the presence of multilateral specific investments 
and externalities then poses a challenge to the unilateral 
hierarchical solution. It vindicates the pursuit of a govern-
ance mechanism able to serve the interests represented by all 
the team members and to resolve the conflict over the distri-
bution of the surplus flowing from team production, while 
minimizing negative externalities. The fair balance of all 
the interests at stake would then legitimize the proper exer-
cise of authority associated with residual decision rights, as 
well as improving transaction costs efficiency with respect to 
the unilateral hierarchical control model. A response to the 
demand for a multi-stakeholder model of governance comes 
from the definition of CSR (Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity) as an ‘‘extended model of governance’’ whereby those 
who hold authority in the organization (board of directors/
top managers) have fiduciary duties that extend from those 
owed to the ‘owners’ to those owed to all other stakehold-
ers (Sacconi 2006a). Specifically, the extended governance 
model is based on three elements: (i) the residual control 
right (ownership) allocated to the stakeholder with the larg-
est investments at risk and with relatively low governance 
costs, as well as the right to delegate authority to profes-
sional directors and management; (ii) the fiduciary duties 
owed to owners by directors and managers, given that the 
former have delegated control to the latter; (iii) the fiduciary 
duties owed to non-controlling stakeholders by those who 
hold an authority position in the firm (owners, directors, and 
managers)—i.e., the obligation to run the firm in a manner 
such that (iiia) these stakeholders are not deprived of fair 
shares of the surplus jointly derived from specific invest-
ments, and (iiib) they are not subject to negative externalities 
(Sacconi 2006a). Fiduciaries’ duties derive directly from the 
basic implicit agreement amongst all the corporate stake-
holders that grounds the corporation as a unified governance 
system and rationally explains and legitimizes acceptance 
of the firm’s hierarchical structure by the non-controlling 
stakeholders.
Although the above model is rather idealized, it offers a 
rational potential explanation of the emergence of several 
legal forms of corporations that have historically provided 
a balance among different stakeholders’ interests. Such 
explanation is parallel to a justification for these historically 
observed forms of CG based on the idea of a fair and mutu-
ally advantageous stakeholders’ agreement. Some examples 
are the American tradition of corporate law that understands 
the firm as a ‘‘mediating hierarchy’’ (Blair and Stout 1999; 
Stout 2012), the Co-determination model of German large 
corporations (Gelter 2009); the Japanese model of mana-
gerial capitalism (Aoki 2010), Benefit Corporations (Hiller 
2013), and European social cooperatives (Sacchetti 2015). 
CSR self-regulations and policies can be also interpreted 
as attempts at the corporate level to introduce some bal-
ances that extend the governance mechanism by additional 
responsibilities toward non-controlling stakeholders (Sac-
coni 2006a, 2011a) .
From the Micro‑social Contract of the Firm 
to a Rawlsian Constitutional Contract
In this section, we first ask the question concerning the 
normative justification of the multi-stakeholder model and 
answer that the SC perspective offers the best response.3 We 
then show that from the basic idea of micro-level agreement 
among the corporate stakeholder, it is natural to ascend to 
3 See Appendix  1 on why Utilitarianism seems not to provide an 
equally satisfying justification of the stakeholder approach.
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a broader constitutional choice on the general principles. 
Then, according to the model of constitutional and post-
constitutional contracts, we illustrate that such general prin-
ciples are consequently applied at the micro-contract level. 
Thereafter we show that the constitutional (social) contract 
on CG principles is genuinely Rawlsian.
A first attempt to develop a normative foundation of the 
multi-stakeholder model of CG can be found in Freeman and 
Evan’s seminal work (1993) in which they highlight the fidu-
ciary relationships between the firm and all its stakeholders 
and the ensuing nature of the firm as a tool for coordinating 
efforts aimed at satisfying all the stakeholders’ interests. A 
definition of CG and strategy based on the Kantian view is 
suggested: because all stakeholders are not merely means for 
the firm but also ends in themselves, their rights and interests 
should be pursued as corporate goals by the firm, and they 
should also participate in decisions affecting their interests 
(Freeman and Evan 1993). Similarly, other normative justi-
fications of stakeholder theory (Donaldson 1982; Donaldson 
and Preston 1995) are based on the idea that a ‘managerial’ 
stakeholder approach should be consistent with a complex 
view of property rights, which includes not only claims to 
control and residual earnings but also the owner’s constraints 
and responsibilities toward stakeholders.4 Neither of these 
formulations of the stakeholder model, however, provides a 
logical analysis of the stakeholders’ agreement at the micro-
level of the firm that—by exploiting the analytical tool of the 
theory of choice—is able to account for the fair and efficient 
agreement amongst the firm’s stakeholders. This endeavor 
has been accomplished by the SCTF (Sacconi 1999, 2000, 
2006a, b, 2007, 2011a, b) that analytically works out the 
firms’ multi-stakeholder objective function that socially 
responsible firms maximize. That is the joint plan of action 
that corresponds to their agreement, solving their mixed 
motive interaction in which both mutual advantage for coop-
eration and distributive conflict are interlocked. SCTF in 
turn specifies the fiduciary duties owed to each stakeholder 
and the way in which different interests can be balanced and 
pursued. Thus, the SCTF provides a justification of the idea 
of CSR as an extended form of governance.
The stakeholder approach has been frequently criticized 
on the grounds that it is impossible for the corporate entity 
to pursue the many incompatible and separate interests of 
different stakeholder categories (Jensen 2001; Marcoux 
2003; Mansell 2013; for a stakeholder-sympathetic view 
that, nonetheless, subordinates the distributive problem to 
the higher level objective of the company as such, hence 
not derivable form a combination of the stakeholders’ inter-
ests, see; Leader 1999). But for the SCTF, the answer to this 
criticism is quite simple: an enterprise does not separately 
pursue the interest of each of the stakeholders. Rather, as an 
artificial actor (persona) aimed at solving problems of coop-
eration amongst different stakeholders, it pursues the joint 
plan of action (strategy) identified by the fair (Nash) bargain-
ing solution to which these stakeholders would agree in an 
initial agreement (Sacconi 2000, 2006a, b). By no means is 
such a bargaining solution less defined or calculable than 
any profit maximizing strategy.
Besides the use of bargaining theory to model the SC 
(Gauthier 1986; Binmore 1998, 2005) and to understand 
cooperation in the firm (Aoki 1984), SCTF rests on an 
analogy between the multi-stage model of constitutional 
and post-constitutional contracts of the society at large 
(Buchanan 1975) and the inter-temporal model of efficient 
choice of firms’ control structure based on the idea of con-
tractual incompleteness (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 
and Moore 1990). This analogy suggests that the problems 
faced by the two theories, even though at different levels of 
abstraction, are essentially the same. The second inquires as 
to the reasons for accepting ex-ante a control structure that 
affects ex-post the renegotiation stage (always possible under 
incomplete contract) wherein final payoffs are allocated after 
specific investments have taken place. Similarly, the first 
analyzes the constitutional agreement on the allocation of 
rights and endowments that ex-post (in the post-constitu-
tional stage) affects bargaining on the formation of specific 
productive coalitions and the final allocation of payoffs.
In the perspective of SCTF, we can distinguish three 
related models that explore the emergence of the firm with a 
governance structure composed of multiple fiduciary duties:
 (i) a simple model at the micro-level of the firm, where 
the stakeholders agreement is decomposed into two 
steps: a pactum unionis for the creation of a multi-
stakeholder association and a pactum subjectionis by 
which stakeholders agree on a governance structure;
 (ii) a two-stage sequential bargaining model wherein at 
the first stage constitutional rules are agreed, so that 
at the second stage for any alternative rules arrange-
ment a different post-constitutional game is played 
on the formation of different coalition structures 
(firms), according to which productive contributions 
are delivered and final payoffs allocated;
 (iii) a game theoretical model of equilibrium selection, 
wherein the constitution must be selected in a ‘state 
of nature’ and the agreement ‘under a veil of igno-
rance’ provides the basic selection device; it repro-
duces Binmore’s interpretation of Rawls’ decision in 
the ‘original position’ and applies it to the stakehold-
ers agreement on the constitution of the firm from 
‘state of nature’ perspective.4 See Freeman et  al. (2010) for the state of the art on stakeholder 
theory.
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 The progression from the first to the third model is func-
tional to the aim of the paper. Exploiting Dunfee and Don-
aldson’s distinction between “macro SC” and “micro SC” 
(Dunfee and Donaldson 1995), this progression traces the 
pathway that leads from the basic stakeholder agreement 
at the firm micro-level to the constitutional contract on 
CG principle that justifies and shapes such basic agree-
ment. Then it brings us to the even more abstract debate on 
whether is it possible to fully integrate CG into the frame-
work of Rawlsian TJ.
The Basic Model of SCTF
The first model is a firm micro-level agreement decompos-
able into two steps: the pactum unionis for the creation of a 
multi-stakeholder association, and the pactum subjectionis 
by which stakeholders agree on a governance structure. In 
this model (Sacconi 2006a, 2011a), at a first stage, stake-
holders interact in a quasi-Hobbesian market scenario in 
which transactions among stakeholders are imperfectly 
regulated by incomplete contracts. Hence, they are subject 
to opportunism and end up in substantial failures of potential 
cooperation. The First SC of the firm (pactum unionis) is 
nothing more than a (Nash) bargaining agreement reached 
by all the stakeholders to exit the state of nature and set up a 
productive association (Nash 1950; Harsanyi 1977a). That 
is, they agree on a joint strategy that allows them to start a 
cooperative activity and team production without the threat 
that someone’s investment may be expropriated because of 
the opportunist renegotiation. However, the association’s 
governance costs (e.g., due to moral hazard in teams) are 
high, and they require a second agreement on a governance 
structure for the association. By means of a second SC of the 
firm (pactum subjections), the residual control right is del-
egated to the most efficient stakeholder in governance costs. 
Her/his authority, however, is constrained by a basic proviso 
of fiduciary duties owed to the non-controlling stakeholders 
deriving from the pactum unionis.
This model treats the firm as an apparently isolated and 
self-contained institution, emerging for an incomplete mar-
ket and based on its own basic agreement. Nevertheless, in 
this model some fair terms—prior to the economic exchange 
regulated by the two agreements—are in some sense taken 
for granted. In fact, similarly to Gauthier’s‘‘Lockean 
proviso’’(Gauthier 1986), the status quo of the bargaining 
problem at the pactum unionis stage takes for granted that 
certain basic rights (including freedom and basic endow-
ments) are symmetrically held by the parties. It is thus 
assumed that agents have symmetrical opportunities to take 
part in a basic associative agreement. Both of those terms 
are implied in the idea of symmetry of the bargaining game 
and the ‘status quo’ wherefrom the multi-stakeholder asso-
ciation is agreed—meaning that the set of strategic resources 
that agents own are similar, and that the minimal conditions 
that any acceptable associative agreement must grant to all 
stakeholders are similar too. Hence, the model works ‘as if’ 
a previous constitution had granted these basic rights and 
endowments to all participants in the foundation of the firm.
(Partial) Constitutional and Post‑constitutional 
Contracts
The second SCTF model (Sacconi 2000, 2006b, 2011b, see 
also; Francés-Gómez 2003) proposes a two-tier contractar-
ian theory of the firm based on backward reasoning in a 
sequential bargaining game (see also Brock 1979). Firstly, 
there is a constitutional stage where the parties establish 
an agreement (the ‘constitution of the firm’) on everyone’s 
basic endowments of economic rights and duties concerning 
the use of production means. Secondly, there is a post-con-
stitutional stage where economic interaction takes place and 
the parties have to agree on a ‘joint strategy’ for carrying out 
cooperation and team production with which a final alloca-
tion of payoffs is associated. The ‘constitution of the firm’ 
does not pick a single joint strategy and a particular payoff 
allocation directly; it only restricts the set of strategies open 
to each party in post-constitutional interaction. But because 
we know the solution for each post-constitutional bargain-
ing game (shaped by a particular constitution), we may say 
that players solve the constitutional bargaining problem by 
comparing the post-constitutional solutions (and payoff allo-
cations) from the perspective of the appropriate ‘constitu-
tional’ solution. The criteria adopted in the two agreements 
are hence of prime importance. In the first agreement, the 
distribution of rights and duties is made before social pro-
duction has occurred; thus distribution of basic economic 
rights should be made according to a principle applicable 
before the merit of any contribution can be claimed, i.e., the 
‘relative needs’ criterion. From the mathematical viewpoint 
(and under the special assumption of interpersonal utility 
comparability) it is essentially identical to the Nash bargain-
ing solution (Harsanyi 1977a; Brock 1979). In the second 
agreement, any agent decides whether to enter any coopera-
tive coalition (firm) possible under the chosen constitution 
according to a distribution rule of the jointly produced sur-
plus. That is, once the basic endowments have been fairly 
allotted, the surplus distribution should be then proportional 
to each party’s contribution and personal responsibility for 
the value produced, i.e., proportional to the relative contri-
bution. From the mathematical viewpoint, it is essentially 
identical to the Shapley value (Shapley 1953). The surplus is 
affected by both initial endowments—influencing the ability 
to carry out (specific) investment—and the actual contribu-
tions that the parties deliver to any cooperative coalition. In 
fact, the two mentioned principles of economic justice are 
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mutually consistent and will both be reflected in the final 
payoffs’ distribution.
This can be understood by reasoning backwards. Start-
ing from each post-constitutional game, each individual—
having equal rational capabilities—properly employs her/
his endowments in order to profit as much as possible. 
Hence, each post-constitutional contract on the structure of 
productive cooperation under each constitution will entitle 
any participant to payoffs proportional to her/his potential 
contribution to any coalition. At the constitutional stage, 
however, agents compare the final distributions predictable 
across all the post-constitutional contracts from the perspec-
tive of the relative needs principle. Hence they select the one 
contribution-relative distribution that most satisfies also the 
need-relative proportionality. This model assumes that the 
bargaining space of the constitutional choice is symmetrical 
because it comprises all the logically possible allocations of 
control rights and endowments, i.e., for any given allocation 
that may advantage player A over player B, it includes also 
the symmetrical allocation that advantages player B over 
player A to the same extent. Therefore, the optimal con-
stitution is selected by choosing amongst all the possible 
post-constitutional solutions the distribution of payoffs that 
maximizes the symmetric Nash bargaining function, i.e., 
applies the (efficient) egalitarian division rule. The final 
payoff distribution corresponds to a multiple fiduciary gov-
ernance model wherein all the stakeholders are treated fairly.
So far we have furnished a reconstruction of how a two-
tier bargaining sequential cooperative game may give rise to 
a firm governance structure composed of multiple fiduciary 
duties (Sacconi 2006b). We call this model ‘partial-constitu-
tional and post-constitutional contracts’ as it considers only 
a subsection of the overall constitution, i.e., the one pertain-
ing to the constitution of the firm, assuming that it can be 
analyzed as a relatively autonomous institution with respect 
to the other institutions of society. However, the model still 
does not analyze this partial constitution in terms of an 
agreement emerging from a ‘state of nature’ interpretable 
as the “original position” in which the agreement is reached 
‘under a veil of ignorance,’ so as to emphasize that the solu-
tion is consistent with a Rawlsian view on the constitution 
of CG.
A Rawlsian View of the Constitutional Contract 
of the Firm
The third model (Sacconi 2011a, b, 2013) fills this gap by 
introducing the assumption that the agreement on the firm’s 
constitution is reached in a ‘state of nature,’ according to 
which CG forms are institutions traceable back to endog-
enously emerging norms (Posner 1997; Machey 2008), typ-
ically interpreted as Nash equilibria of a non-cooperative 
repeated game (Lewis 1969; Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Young 
1998; Sacconi 2000; Binmore 2005). Consequently, only a 
subset of all possible institutional alternatives is feasible (the 
equilibrium solutions) and the choice of a constitution must 
be restricted only to this feasible set. However, equilibrium 
norms (Nash equilibria) are always multiple and hence the 
equilibrium selection problem remains. Moreover, feasible 
constitutions may be assumed to allocate control rights to 
one party or another, so that in the post-constitutional inter-
action the payoff-space of the game played under each fea-
sible institutional alternative can result ‘asymmetric.’ This 
adds realism to the previous model by introducing arbitrary 
inequalities. In fact, authority observed in the business world 
is mostly asymmetrically allocated rather than equally split 
among all the parties. This nevertheless poses a problem 
for the theory as long as it seems that only constitutions 
that unilaterally allocate control according to a second-best 
solution can be selected.
Here Binmore’s game theoretical reformulation of the 
Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ and ‘maximin principle’ enters 
the scene (Binmore 1989, 1998, 2005). It consists of consid-
ering the SC under the veil as the appropriate equilibrium 
selection device. Under the veil of ignorance, any asymmet-
rical payoff-space (related to a constitution) is paired with 
its symmetrical translation by replacing the player positions 
symmetrically. This engenders a symmetric intersection 
set of feasible outcomes that are the equilibria affordable 
under both the representations of the payoff-space. Within 
this symmetrical subset the only rational agreement is the 
egalitarian bargaining solution. Since in asymmetrical payoff 
spaces, equality, if possible, typically most favors the worst-
off party, the Rawls–Binmore egalitarian SC always selects a 
non-cooperative equilibrium coinciding with an application 
of the Rawlsian maximin principle.
Applied to the SCTF, the model, under the assumption 
that the corporate structure must belong to the set of pos-
sible (Nash) equilibrium institutions and that the veil of 
ignorance is the equilibrium selection device, shows that 
the constitution of the firm is chosen by comparing only 
egalitarian (equilibrium) solutions across the alternative 
constitutions feasible in the original position. Pareto effi-
ciency only serves to order egalitarian solutions (Sacconi 
2011b); accordingly, the best (Pareto dominant) egalitarian 
solution is selected notwithstanding any further considera-
tion in terms of wealth maximization or efficiency that could 
concern non-egalitarian solutions. Mutual advantage thus 
only plays a role within the set of egalitarian solutions. This 
is a direct consequence of assuming that in the original posi-
tion only (Nash) equilibria (i.e., stable) constitution can be 
selected, and requiring that selection must be made by agree-
ment under impartiality and impersonality. Accordingly, the 
constitution selected, among those feasible, is the one that 
maximizes the position of the worse-off stakeholder (Sac-
coni 2011b). Roughly, even if institutional arrangements are 
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unequal in terms of strategy opportunities allowed to partici-
pants, the payoffs corresponding to the selected equilibrium 
outcome are the distribution that maximizes the utility of the 
worse-off stakeholder.
The policy implication is straightforward: if self-sustain-
ability (equilibrium) of the CG structure is required, then 
fairness must override efficiency, challenging the idea that 
firms should be committed only to efficiency.5 The proposed 
extended fiduciary duties model (as the best egalitarian solu-
tion) balances different interests requiring redress for the 
distributive consequences of the unilateral allocation of 
authority. If a party must be granted full authority to protect 
her/his incentive and promote efficiency, nevertheless s/he 
must be subject to the constitutional constraint to redress 
the non-controlling parties for any abuse of authority these 
parties suffer because of the extractive strategy of the party 
in the position of authority. Note that this result does not 
follow from wishful thinking but from the incentive compat-
ibility condition implicit in the requirement of having stable 
institutions (equilibrium).
The second, and even more the third model of SCTF, 
represents the logical connection between the theory of the 
firm and the TJ. The second model shows how the consti-
tutional contract may incorporate principles for the firm’s 
control structure, while the third shows how this ‘partial 
constitution’ can be truly Rawlsian. Even though ‘partial,’ 
these constitutional contracts can be interpreted as part of 
the ‘grand SC,’ which is typically the subject of justice. The 
‘constitution of the firm’ that results from the constitutional 
agreement restricts post-constitutional interaction (within 
which concrete firms are started) to those organizations that 
grant rights and duties according to the limits constitution-
ally stated. Thus, powers and prerogatives that the stake-
holders will have in coalition formation, the choice of the 
joint strategy and the final distribution of the joint surplus 
will reflect the basic rights provided at constitutional level. 
In analogy to the methodology adopted by Donaldson and 
Dunfee (1995), we can understand the agreement on the 
economic constitution as part of the ‘macro SC’ concerning 
the economic principles that preside over subsequent inter-
actions; while the second agreement, which operates at the 
level of business interaction, can be seen as a ‘micro SC.’6
Corporate Governance & Rawls’ Theory 
of Justice
Rawls and the Firm
Connecting the “micro” to the “macro” SC brings us to 
Rawls’ TJ. For Rawls, ‘the primary subject of justice is 
the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in 
which major social institutions distribute fundamental rights 
and duties and determine the division of advantages from 
social cooperation’ (Rawls 1971, p. 7). Institutions per-
taining to the basic structure of society distribute certain 
primary social goods, i.e., the means with which to pursue 
any rational plan of life. Social cooperation is character-
ized by ‘moderate scarcity,’ i.e., situations in which coop-
eration may produce a mutually advantageous joint surplus 
of each primary good, but parties have conflicting interests 
over its distribution. They then have to solve two simultane-
ous problems by agreement: a distributive conflict, and a 
collective choice problem concerning the selection of the 
best cooperative action enabling them to produce the maxi-
mum surplus. Rawls propounds the ‘original position’ as a 
model of choice on principles regulating how basic insti-
tutions distribute primary goods. This model solves those 
simultaneous problems, so that the basic structures must be 
seen as the set of institutions that enable cooperation in the 
production of a social surplus. It is formulated by develop-
ing an unanimous ordinal ranking of preferences on primary 
goods, represented as that of a single individual behind the 
veil of ignorance, hence an individual whose perspective is 
the same as anybody else’s. The primary goods identified by 
Rawls are liberty and opportunities (political liberty, free-
dom of speech, liberty of conscience and thought, freedom 
of the person along with the right to hold personal property), 
powers and prerogatives of authority, income and wealth, 
and the bases for self-respect (Rawls 1971). The domain of 
justice is thus limited to basic institutions of society insofar 
as these institutions provide primary goods that are instru-
mental to any joint cooperative activity in society and at the 
same time have the authority to impose compliance with 
their principles on all those belonging to the political com-
munity regulated by them (Rawls 2001).
There is a debate on whether corporations can be candi-
dates for entering Rawls’ basic structure. On one side, we 
find Singer’s contrary view (Singer 2015) who, adopting the 
view of the nexus-of-contract theory of the firm (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976), argues that firms 
are basically a voluntary form of association. Consequently, 
firms are not entitled to enter the basic structure because 
they do not have the power to inhibit exit from contracts by 
those who do not share their basic rules. This would be con-
sistent with Rawls himself, who explicitly excluded private 
6 This analogy is however partial since Donaldson and Dunfee 
(1995) do not provide a sequential bargaining explanation of the 
‘macro/micro’ SC.
5 See Kaplow and Shavell (2009) for this idea in law & economics, 
see also Singer (2016).
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associations from the basic structure (Rawls 1971). On the 
other side, Blanc (2016), on replying to Singer, argues that 
CGs coercing citizens through labor law are entitled to enter 
the domain of basic institutions. Similarly, Arnold (2013) 
argues that corporations do not fit into the category of free 
association.7 To this debate we add the consideration that 
Singer’s thesis is not supported by the main line of thought 
in transaction cost economics (even if he quotes Alchian 
and Demsetz). In fact, NIE—which from Coase, through 
Simon, Arrow and Williamson, extends to the GHM model 
and Aoki—maintains that allocation of authority, lock-in 
effects and complementarity of human resources are corpo-
rations’ main characteristics.
Corporate Governance Takes a Place in the ‘Basic 
Structure’
There are two main reasons to support the inclusion of firms 
(and CG) in Rawls’ basic structure. The first is that firms 
distribute primary goods: they allocate power and author-
ity, incomes and wealth, and the basis of self-respect (e.g., 
decent careers are means enabling people to be autonomous 
individuals integrated into society). Moreover, careers are 
open or closed to all according to how opportunities are set 
within firms (e.g., having managerial or technical careers 
depends on open employment procedures). The second 
reason rests on the more general criterion that establishes 
the boundary between the political object of the TJ and the 
associative domain that enters the sphere of what Rawls calls 
‘local justice.’ Rawls limits the application of his principles 
of justice to the basic institutions operating in a society in 
which the legal system acts as a coercive order of public 
rules to regulate people’s conduct and provides the frame-
work (social institutions) for social cooperation (Rawls 
1971). However, rules and practices governing private asso-
ciations fall outside the scope of application of the principles 
of justice. In fact, associations guarantee people’s exit free-
dom as they are characterized by voluntary relationships and 
not by coercion. Rawls considers firms as unimportant in the 
distribution of primary social goods as long as they are seen 
as free associations, from which individuals are free to exit if 
they are not satisfied in the pursuit of their life plans, subject 
to the general conditions of the economy. However, the NIE 
view of the firm concurs with the contention of Blanc (2016) 
and Arnold (2013) that corporations establish authority rela-
tions with employees; consequently, they cannot properly 
enter Rawls’ free association category. In the perspective of 
NIE, corporations are institutions more similar to political 
ones than voluntary associations, being essentially hierarchi-
cal organizations that allocate authority.8 According to some 
prominent accounts (Hart and Moore 1990; Grossman and 
Hart 1986), authority is even based on a quite crude threat 
of exclusion from access to resources necessary for stake-
holders to be able to profit from their specific investments. 
Hence, it entails the risk that they may lose the fruits of 
their investments (income and wealth at minimum, but some 
of the conditions of self-respect) that would allow them to 
pursue their life plans. Then allocation of authority impacts 
on the distribution of primary goods, and it may generate 
inequalities accordingly. Moreover, the substantial losses 
that someone would incur on exiting (or being excluded 
from) the corporation in which s/he has made specific invest-
ments are analogous to the sanctions someone could incur 
in order to exit a political community. The conclusion is 
that firms should be excluded from the domain of the TJ 
if and only if they actually act as free associations without 
allocating authority and without exercising threat power. But 
in this case, the firm would not exist, at least according to 
the efficiency explanation provided by NIE. This reasoning 
in terms of economic analysis gives more substance to the 
idea that ‘private orderings’ are not simply market ones, and 
corporations involve substantial exercise of power. Given 
this interpretation, we define firms as entities that enter the 
domain of social justice theory. This furnishes a basis for 
understanding the principles regulating CG as part of the 
design of the constitutional contract of society. In turn, this 
also supports the adoption of the two-step SC model for the 
emergence of the firm in its ‘micro–macro’ interpretation 
previously presented. The first step, at the macro level, con-
sists in the choice of the principles for CG in line with gen-
eral principles of justice. The second step, at the micro-level, 
is to select concrete firm forms according to contingencies 
and an efficiency analysis, but always granting that firms are 
shaped by principles of justice established at the first step. 
Of course, this interpretation does not provide a complete 
application of the two Rawlsian principles of justice to CG. 
However, we do not want to go further into the details of 
a debate on the possibility of giving a complete account 
7 Diverse criteria for the inclusion of institutions in the basic struc-
ture of society have been proposed. Among others, the functional cri-
terion, first proposed by Freeman (2007) and then varyingly adapted 
by other authors (Heath et  al. 2010; Taylor 2004), is based on the 
idea that institutions should be central to social cooperation. Then, 
O’Neill (2009) and Blanc and Al-Amoudi (2013) include institu-
tions that have an effect on the distribution of primary goods. Hsieh 
(2008) identifies as a basic structure the level of economic democracy 
and in particular of workplace democracy, understood as the collec-
tive allocation of residual decision-making rights as long as it helps 
in achieving some further goal. Moreover, Néron (2010) investigates 
the role of corporations as distributive agents. Finally, Norman (2015) 
stresses the importance of ownership and governance in the TJ.
8 See also Anderson (2015), where the point is made even more 
sharply by contending that contemporary American corporations 
have become ‘private government.’
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of CG in terms of Rawls’ principles of justice. Rather, by 
following Sen (1981, 1992, 1998, 2009), in the next section 
we focus on whether it is possible to exploit his suggestion 
to broaden the realm of social justice beyond Rawls’ theory 
in a way that is suitable to the project of integrating CG in 
the ‘idea of justice.’
Sen’s Capabilities Approach 
and the Corporate Domain
In this section, we adopt a syncretic approach between Sen 
and Rawls, introducing Sen’s capabilities concept as a funda-
mental element of the constitutional and post-constitutional 
contracts concerning the institutional ordering of CG. At 
the same time, we interpret Sen’s criticism of Rawls’ insti-
tutional perfectionism as indicating an excessively narrow 
application of the TJ. This criticism further legitimizes the 
claim that principles of justice, accepted at the constitutional 
level, may shape a set of institutions broader than that admit-
ted by Rawls, specifically CG.
Attention has recently been paid in the business ethics 
literature to Sen’s CA. Examples are the works investigating 
the impact of corporations on human well-being, focusing on 
the enterprise’s goals and consequences in terms of capabili-
ties and functionings (Shrivastava and Selvarajah 2016; Gar-
riga 2014; Renuard 2011). Moreover, CA has received atten-
tion from the management literature focused on labor market 
issues and employees’ welfare; see Westermann-Behaylo 
et al. (2016) for a brief review. Westermann-Behaylo et al. 
(2016) also contribute to the debate by appealing to Sen’s 
CA in the context of stakeholder management and CG.9 Oth-
ers focus on the theoretical foundations of economics and 
business, rethinking their anthropological assumptions based 
on CA (Giovanola 2009), or on improving the fit between 
virtue ethics and business ethics (Bertland 2009). We depart 
from this literature by focusing on the entitlement compo-
nent of CA and its relation to CG, thus providing the missing 
link between CG and Sen’s ‘idea of justice.’10
Capabilities and Primary Goods
Sen’s seminal work shifts the Rawlsian emphasis from pri-
mary social goods seen as open-ended means (or resources) 
to consideration of the actual opportunities of living, seen 
as ends (Sen 1992, 2009).11 The central idea of Sen’s well-
being theory is the concept of capabilities and function-
ings. Functionings are states of ‘doing and being,’ i.e., what 
a person manages to do or to be; capabilities are defined 
derivatively as the set of achievable functionings. While 
the achieved functionings constitute a person’s well-being, 
capabilities reflect the freedom to choose among them (Sen 
2009). Specifically, well-being is not derived from the sub-
jective pleasure given by goods consumption; rather, it is 
linked to the ‘objective’ functionings that a person is able to 
realize within the set of her/his capabilities (i.e., potential 
functionings), and it depends on her/his personal choices. 
The concept of capability can be seen as the opportunity 
to use goods in order to achieve the internal standard of 
excellence in every given field of human activity. That is to 
function properly in a given domain of human life, e.g., to 
be well-fed, be a good engineer, take part in community life, 
etc.. Hence for Sen the capabilities to achieve functionings, 
rather than the Rawlsian primary social goods (or resources), 
are therefore the basic terms of a metric of justice.
Given the considerable discussion amongst Rawlsian 
philosophers raised by the proposed shift from resources 
to capabilities and functionings, one may question how we 
succeed in making Rawls’ and Sen’s perspectives mutually 
consistent in the context of our research.12 However, not 
even Pogge, who mostly criticizes the CA from the per-
spective of an institutionalist TJ, denies the importance of 
capabilities and functionings at least as heuristic tools. In 
fact, a distribution of resources unable to guarantee some 
fundamental functionings to the worst-off members of soci-
ety would suggest either that the adopted distributive rule 
should be reconsidered or that the current analysis of what 
counts as primary social goods is inadequate (Pogge 2002, 
2010). Nevertheless, in the CA any inferior level of natural 
endowments in whatever ability, lack of talent or handicap 
counts as a relevant disadvantage. Since the CA requires 
12 See the book Measuring Justice (Brighouse and Robeyns 2010) 
with relevant essays by Pogge  (Pogge,  2010), Kelly (Kelly,  2010), 
Anderson (Anderson, 2010), Arneson (Arneson, 2010) and Sen him-
self (Sen, 2010). However, as specified in note 1, Martha Nussbaum 
(2011) has already suggested an approach to fundamental function-
ings and capabilities in constitutional law that interprets them as 
resulting from a Rawlsian ‘overlapping consensus.’ See also Basu and 
Kanbur (2009).
9 Westermann-Behaylo et  al. (2016) also argue that firms have an 
effect on the human dignity and capability of their stakeholders and 
advance a management model grounded in stakeholder theory inte-
grated with Sen’s concept of capabilities. The idea is that “a firm 
can include the capabilities approach in its overall strategy and 
operations”(p.  534). They also provide interesting examples of how 
the firm’s operation may negatively/positively affect stakeholders’ 
capabilities, e.g., the impact on tobacco consumption of custom-
ers’ cancer or the firm’s work/life balance policies for its employees. 
However, our argument here is focused on the entitlement compo-
nent of capabilities and its relation to CG (as allocation of rights and 
duties), rather than on the effect of firms’ strategy/policies on stake-
holders’ capabilities.
10 On private governance mechanisms and CA in global economy see 
however Kalfagianni (2014).
11 Sen criticizes primary goods as inflexible metrics of justice 
because people may have different abilities to convert goods into 
actual ways of doing or being in their lives, i.e., they do not take the 
diversity of human beings into account, thus ignoring real differences 
(Sen 1980).
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consideration of compensation for any of these inequalities 
as a claim of justice, Pogge contends that capabilities are 
not the basis for a metric of justice. In fact, someone who is 
less endowed with some ability may be better endowed with 
some other. Therefore, in order to compensate such inequali-
ties, all natural capabilities should be compared and ordered 
according to some ranking principle. Hence, the opportunity 
cost of any improvement in one and loss in another capa-
bility should also be calculated. Rightly, therefore, Pogge 
maintains that not even Sen has proposed such a general cri-
terion of social ordering, but limits his analysis of well-being 
to unanimous but incomplete orderings of combinations of 
very few and basic functionings wherein each is taken in 
monotonically increasing quantities.
Nevertheless, Anderson (2010) draws a fundamental 
distinction between a metric of justice and the choice of a 
rule of distribution. Specifically, she points out that Pogge’s 
problem pertains to a particular choice of the distributive 
rule, i.e., a rule of overall compensation of any capability 
inequality as unjust.13 Such a problem could not be raised 
in regard to Nussbaum’s list of ‘constitutional capabilities 
and functionings’ (Nussbaum 2011) or a ‘sufficientarian’ 
criterion. In fact, according to the latter initial unequal capa-
bilities have to be improved just to reach the threshold that 
satisfies the requirement of putting everyone in the condition 
of exercising equal democratic citizenship (Anderson 1999, 
2010). Democratic equality sets an independent standard 
that avoids the problem of a complete social ordering of all 
possible capabilities. Moreover, it is ‘Rawlsian’ in inspira-
tion as far as it points to the subsets of capabilities corre-
sponding to Rawlsian higher order interests of free and equal 
persons to develop: (i) the capability of developing a sense 
of justice, i.e., to adhere to just institutions; and (ii) the capa-
bility of choosing a rational plan of life (Rawls 1980). On the 
contrary, a justice metric based on functionings and capabili-
ties would be richer and more informative than that based on 
resources, since it considers interpersonal variations (in per-
sonal characteristics, physical environments, or local social 
norms). In fact, such variations may substantially affect the 
capability to accomplish functionings even though individu-
als are given equal shares of resources. Inequalities that may 
arise can be markedly unjust and correcting them may be 
essential in order to guarantee democratic equality. Accord-
ingly, we exploit the capability metric to show that the lack 
of democratization and social responsibility in the domain 
of CG would dramatically hinder the potential functionings 
open to some persons (typically the firm’s employees) to the 
unjust advantage of others (typically capital owners). This 
will occur even in the presence of a constitution that grants 
an equal share of socially primary goods and resources (pro-
viding people with some basic capabilities not yet extended 
to cover CG) (see Appendix 2). Our criterion for identifying 
such injustices is not indefinite, but consistent with the idea 
of a SC on the constitution of the firm. That is, with the idea 
of equal participation in the agreement providing the rules 
for productive activities that make the society a cooperative 
venture for mutual advantage, and, especially, with the idea 
of democratic equality in the economic sphere.14
Capabilities as Skills and (Legal) Entitlements
In this section, we provide a more precise analysis of the 
notion of capability needed for its use to make sense of CG 
in light of the idea of justice. The relationship between goods 
and functionings is explained by analyzing the goods’ char-
acteristics, i.e., the multiple elements into which they can be 
decomposed.15 The appropriate uses of such characteristics 
by means of a set of conversion functions allow individuals 
to realize a combination of functionings. The characteristics 
of a good, the conversion functions and the range of control 
over these functions define ‘an agent’s capability set.’ Then, 
by choosing among such capabilities, an agent can transform 
a good into a ‘realized functioning.’ Each agent selects dif-
ferent conversion functions among those available to him/
her, and, for any choice, s/he obtains a vector of achieved 
functionings where each component shows the degree of 
achievement in the corresponding functioning. Hence, the 
process that leads from goods to well-being comprises 
many steps: (i) a set of characteristics of goods provides 
‘raw materials’ for functioning; (ii) a set of transformation 
functions defines which functionings are objectively possible 
for an agent; (iii) a subset of these transformation functions 
defines what an agent is capable of; (iv) an agent’s freedom 
of choice is exercised within the capability set under his/
her control; (v) by choosing some transformation functions 
within his/her capability set an agent realizes achieved func-
tionings; (vi) achieved functioning vectors are weighed-up 
to establish levels of well-being.
13 In Anderson’s words “The metric characterizes the type of good 
subject to demands of distributive justice. The rule specifies how that 
good should be distributed.” (Anderson 2010, p. 81).
14 We thank an anonymous referee who enquired how we position 
ourselves in the debate on the relative advantage of a capability met-
ric over a resource metric, and the distributive principle for redressing 
inequalities of capabilities. To exploit this opportunity completely, we 
have added Appendix 2, where we show how CA is more fruitful for 
understanding unjust inequalities in functioning that emerge from the 
domain of CG but would not be noticed on looking at the subject only 
in terms of resources. There we also show the parallelism between 
our contractarian approach to CG and Anderson’s ‘sufficientarian 
rule,’ especially when her recent analysis of private government (cf. 
Anderson 2017) is considered.
15 The ‘Characteristic approach’ originates in K. Lancaster (1979).
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To transform characteristics into achieved functionings 
an agent must possess the right to access the characteristics, 
the ability to use them properly, and the freedom to choose 
whether to make such use according to her/his will. Thus, 
the object of a metric of justice is not directly the distribu-
tion of functionings; rather, it is the distribution to all of as 
large as possible sets of capabilities (limited by a constrain-
ing principle of just distribution, e.g., a sufficientarian rule) 
which are neutral with respect to the individual’s life plan 
and his/her functioning choices.16 To summarize, function-
ings constitute the person’s well-being, while capabilities 
are processes to transform resources into functionings, but 
also the individual liberty to obtain well-being (Sen 1992).17
Given that capabilities concern conversion processes and 
at the same time the freedom to achieve those things that 
a person values, we can view capabilities as opportunities 
formed by two components: (i) a personal ability of the sub-
ject (‘skill’) and (ii) the possession of valid title (‘entitle-
ment’), i.e., a legal right enforced by the legal system or by 
some other social mechanism (social norms).18 A ‘skill’ is 
a person’s conversion function, and an ‘entitlement’ states 
how many components of the conversion functions set are 
under a person’s control, thus defining the choice set from 
which the person is entitled to select a conversion function 
to realize her/his functioning. In our distinction, the ‘skill’ 
component of capabilities can be understood as personal 
competence or practical knowledge and ability, i.e., a de 
facto notion signifying that capabilities concern the ability 
to do something in practice. It is a personal attribute of the 
subject, understood as the pragmatic or psychological ability 
to do or to be, which may be natural but also improved or 
acquired through training or education. However, the skill 
component would be ineffective in the absence of a (legal) 
right sustaining it, i.e., a de jure notion to which we refer as 
the ‘entitlement’ component. E.g., an individual may have 
a natural predisposition for a skill but does not have access 
to training that skill; or s/he may have learned a skill but is 
not entitled to exercise it, with the consequence that s/he 
does not control it. The concept of entitlement is evident in 
Sen’s seminal work on famines (Sen 1981), where the lack 
of a capability to feed oneself is understood as a lack of 
entitlement to food, i.e., of the ‘right to access to food,’ and 
not so much a lack of food itself. For example, during the 
Bengal famine of 1943 food was available in the shops (and 
protected by the State) but people died because they did not 
have the legal right to access it (Sen 1981,p. 49); this lack 
of entitlement to food is precisely the juridical component 
to which we refer.
Therefore, entitlements are rights that sustain skills. They 
comprise three elements: Freedoms; Positive Claims; Nega-
tive Claims. To clarify how we use these entitlement con-
cepts we borrow from Hohfeld’s analysis of fundamental 
legal relations based on two pairs of opposed concepts: (i) 
‘privileges/claim-rights’ (i.e., rights properly understood) 
concerning first-order legal relations, i.e., relations amongst 
parties ranging over actions on goods; and (ii) ‘power 
/immunities’ concerning second-order relations ranging over 
possible changes of more basic (first-order) legal relations 
(privileges or claim-rights) on goods. Both the pairs exhibit 
the same correlation with two basic logical opposition: (i) 
the opposition duty vs. absence of duty (freedom) in deontic 
logic, and (ii) the even more general opposition necessity 
vs. absence of necessity (possibility) in modal logic (Sum-
ner 1987). Leaving aside second-order legal relations, an 
16 A note is in order here to explain the liberal meaning of Sen’s 
CA. Capabilities are much more concrete and detailed than primary 
goods, which are open-ended in nature. Moreover, capabilities are 
correlated to a certain good’s characteristics and to the functioning 
that can be generated starting from such characteristics, thus refer-
ring to a particular conception of what is a good functioning based on 
given characteristics. This raises the question of whether defining cer-
tain sets of fundamental capabilities might require already knowing 
the individuals’ life plan, thus being at odds with the concept of the 
veil of ignorance. Our answer is ‘no.’ Granting to all a set of capa-
bilities as large as possible means that everybody has the freedom to 
choose among different styles and ways of living, that is, to pursue 
their objectives—those things that they value. In other words, there 
is a set of very elementary and basic functionings that can be under-
stood as preconditions for any life plan and that nobody could refrain 
from choosing. Beyond this, it is up to the individual to decide which 
capabilities to use within the set under his/her control. No doubt, the 
notion of functioning is reminiscent of Aristotelian eudemonia in so 
far as it suggests that any given human activity has an intrinsic/objec-
tive standard of excellence coinciding with a state of well-doing or 
well-being of the agent who achieves it (Sen himself acknowledges 
his indebtedness to Aristotle’s idea of “human flourishing”; see Sen 
2017, p. 356). Nevertheless, there is no presumption of an objective 
hierarchy of functionings, defining a complete, objective and unique 
conception of the good life, that could be commanded by a com-
munitarian tradition (MacIntyre 1984). The metric of justice simply 
suggests that having an as large as possible set of opportunities could 
be better for anyone, but in the end the actual selection of a particu-
lar vector of functionings within this set of opportunities is up to the 
individual.
17 The analysis undertaken so far does not yet establish a criterion 
according to which capabilities must be distributed or inequalities in 
natural or social endowments of capabilities be redressed. Sen does 
not provide a method for generating a complete orderings of func-
tioning vectors from which a society could be asked to choose from; 
rather, he suggests the idea of public discussion and deliberation 
to reach agreement on a contingent list of capabilities. On the con-
trary, Nussbaum proposes a precise list of capabilities—but sees it as 
resulting from an overlapping consensus at constitutional level—and 
Anderson proposes the independent criterion of a sufficiency level of 
capabilities in order to satisfy the standard of democratic equality. 
Obviously, neither of these additional criteria depends on a communi-
tarian version of virtue ethics.
18 Our distinction resembles, but does not coincide with, that 
between ‘internal’ and ‘combined’ capabilities (Nussbaum 2011, 
pp. 20–23).
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agent X’s privilege concerning an action A is a freedom of 
X meant as the possibility (a permission) to perform the 
action A or make some use of a good (amounting to A). Such 
freedom is positively correlated with the absence of duties, 
understood as both absence of X’s duty to refrain from doing 
A, and absence of any other agent’s duty to allow X to do A. 
For example, you may be free to speak in public, but noth-
ing obliges anybody else not to start in the vicinity another 
public speech that may subtract someone from your audi-
ence—even if there is no prohibition that you organize your 
own speech there. Alternatively, you may be permitted to 
enter a wood, which means that you don’t have a duty to stay 
out of the wood, but this does not mean that you may exclude 
anybody else from entering it. On the contrary, an agent 
X’s claim-right is a right in the proper sense meaning that 
X holds the valid claim that somebody else accomplishes 
or refrains from accomplishing an action A in relation to 
X, i.e., these other persons bear a duty to perform or to 
refrain from performing an action A toward X. E.g., if I am 
the wood’s owner I hold an exclusive claim to keep others 
out of the wood, therefore they hold a duty to refrain from 
entering the wood. In general, claim-rights can be ‘negative.’ 
E.g., the right-holder can require the duty-bearer to ‘refrain 
from’ performing some action or from taking some good; 
this can be seen as a right of non-interference that limits 
someone else’s freedom. Typically, an agent’s property right 
on a good is a negative claim addressed to everybody else to 
refrain from taking the good without the right-holder’s per-
mission. Otherwise, claim-rights can be ‘positive’ requiring 
the duty-bearer to perform a positive action or provide some 
service to the right-holder, e.g., the duty to give access to the 
education system or to healthcare services.
Thus, a claim-right is correlated to a duty or the (legal) 
necessity for another person (the duty-bearer) to accomplish 
(or not) a given act toward the right-holder. On the contrary, 
a person’s privilege is simply correlated to the non-existence 
of duties, or of (legal) necessity, either claimed by others 
toward her/him, or claimed by herself toward others, that 
may affect her/his relation with a good or an action on a 
good. Nobody bears any duty, the agent X’s action A is sim-
ply a possibility permitted by the law.
Interpreting the entitlement component of capabilities 
according to this taxonomy, it is now evident that entitle-
ments provide support to skills through a bundle of rights 
that grant access to, and use of the characteristics of goods in 
order to function. A capability as entitlement consists first of 
a privilege to access the characteristics of a good in order to 
apply a skill to it so that it is transformed into a proper level 
of functioning in a given activity. However, this privilege is 
not a right to exclude others from that good, and it does not 
prevent anyone else from having a symmetrical permission 
to access the good. Simultaneously, the entitlement com-
ponent contains a ‘positive claim’ that the agent be given 
the training to form her/his skill to use the characteristic of 
goods that s/he is permitted to access in order to function 
properly with it. Moreover, the entitlement contains also the 
‘negative claim’ that whoever may have control over the 
relevant good cannot arbitrarily debar the right-holder from 
accessing the characteristic of that good (a claim of ‘not 
excludability’). The ‘access’ is the necessary precondition 
for achieving a given functioning and ensures the related 
freedom to use the good.
Capabilities as Entitlements in the Domain 
of Corporate Governance
The set of freedoms, rights, and duties emerging from a CG 
structure are important because they define the real oppor-
tunities (capabilities) offered to all the individuals working 
within the firm. Consider the employee’s right to have a say 
in the decisions that affect the possibility of profiting from 
the investment that s/he has made in (specific) skills. That 
is, for example, the worker’s opportunity to participate in 
(and influence) a decision concerning the possible closure 
of the firm’s sector in which s/he operates and through which 
s/he pursues her/his professional career. This constitutes a 
protection from possible abuses that may be perpetrated by 
the holder of residual control rights. The idea is that the 
capability (entitlement) to participate in these decisions can 
be seen as follows: (i) a negative claim not to be excluded 
from participation in a collective decision-making process; 
and (ii) a positive claim to receive the information necessary 
to take collective or individual decisions that may prevent 
the risk of being abused; and (iii) a (more basic) negative 
claim not to be excluded (without just cause) from access-
ing the physical assets of the firm that are necessary for an 
employee/worker to achieve the functioning. Hence, a duty-
bearer has the obligation not to deter the right-holder’s addi-
tional permission/freedom to access the firm’s assets and to 
participate in some decision process. A negative claim is 
an obligation ‘to refrain’ (not to act); here, it is an obliga-
tion to ‘refrain from excluding’ (unless ‘just cause’ exists). 
Namely, here a negative claim is an obligation to refrain 
from denying (not allowing) access. Admittedly, the first 
and third terms are somewhat awkward because they involve 
double negations, and hence turn out to be a support for an 
independent freedom (possibility) to access the same asset 
and the freedom (possibility) to participate actively in some 
decision processes.19
19 Our view of capability can be easily extended to other stakeholder 
categories. Specifically, we can think of the firm’s decisions that 
may have a polluting impact on the local environment (e.g., harmful 
emissions); or ones that may affect the conservation and protection 
of biological and landscape diversity. The main stakeholder involved 
in such decisions is the local community. The entitlement dimension 
of CA would consist in the community’s opportunity to participate in 
(and prevent) such decisions. This can be achieved, for example, by 
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This makes sense of Sen’s definition of capability as 
‘freedom.’ The double negation in (i) and (iii) in fact entails 
that the worker’s possibility (freedom as privilege) to access 
the company’s assets and internal decision process, and to 
use them so as to achieve some valued functioning, are addi-
tionally protected by a belt of claims-rights. These claim-
rights ensure that no one, even if s/he has a special rela-
tion (i.e., ownership) with the firm’s assets, can prevent the 
worker’s access to assets from being a substantial freedom 
of choice.20
Note that a property right in general consists of a nega-
tive claim excluding any other person from given goods 
or resources. Within firms, it may consist of the claim to 
exclude non-owners from taking residual decisions on 
the use of given assets. Thus, one may ask how capabili-
ties interact with property rights in the domain of CG. The 
above-identified double-negative claim works as a constraint 
on the Blackstonian idea of property in the case of owner-
ship of the firm, that is on a ‘wholesale’ right to exclude 
anyone from a thing.21 Namely, we depart from the defi-
nitions of ownership as backed by the complete right to 
exclude anybody else from accessing and using the firm’s 
physical assets. Thus, we see ownership of the firm’s physi-
cal assets as a bundle of rights that are modulated so as to 
become compatible also with stakeholders’ capabilities and 
consequently entail a notion of ‘abuse’ of authority. In turn, 
capabilities as entitlements consist of the claim to access 
some of these asset-characteristics in order to realize the 
stakeholders’ functionings. Hence, the owner has only a con-
ditioned right to exclude that is subject to certain restrictions 
that reflect stakeholders’ legitimate claims of access. Such 
a right is therefore supportive of the opportunity to realize 
stakeholders’ functionings.
Similarly to Hsieh’s approach (2008) to meaningful 
work, in which employment relationships are characterized 
in terms of assignment of residual decision-making rights, 
we consider the capability to function properly in work as 
related to the allocation of authority. According to the two 
capability components presented above, we underline the 
central role of CG in affecting the individuals’ real opportu-
nities within firms to function in tune with their subjective 
skills/competences. Freedom to exploit such opportunities is 
protected through participation and information rights and, 
mainly, through the claim not to be arbitrarily excluded from 
access to the firm’s assets, coextensively with the right not to 
be arbitrarily fired. Thus, ‘abuse of authority,’ which denies 
these rights, can be also understood as deprivation of the real 
opportunities that an individual has to achieve some basic 
functionings in the realm of work.22
20 Admittedly, Sen emphasizes the importance of freedom both as 
(instrumental) opportunity to choose how to function and as pro-
cess of choice, i.e., the intrinsic value of having a larger rather than 
smaller choice set, within which one is not constrained to act but can 
do so as one wants. This is formulated in consequentialist terms by 
the distinction between achievement of ‘comprehensive outcomes’ vs. 
mere ‘culmination outcomes’ (see Sen 2009, p. 230).
21 See Merril and Smith (Merril and Smith,  2001), on property in 
rem and its explanation in terms of ‘bounded rationality.’ We con-
tend that it does not apply to the ownership of physical assets of a 
firm which are essential to many complementary-specific investments 
and instrumental to the functionings of many stakeholders. Here, our 
analysis of the legal correlate with Sen’s ‘capabilities’ ranges over 
property rights and corporate law (a tentative extension to consum-
ers’ rights is given in Appendix 3). For legal analyses that correlate 
‘capabilities’ with contract law and labor law see respectively Deakin 
(2006), Deakin (2009) and Del Punta (2015).
22 We admit (as two anonymous referees have suggested) that the 
CA extends to employees’ further freedoms in the workplace besides 
those on which we have focused—e.g., free speech and political 
freedom, and the liberty to profess one’s religious faith. Moreover, 
the CA may also suggest considering the employees’ opportunity to 
exploit their capabilities to creatively innovate their jobs and their 
tasks, so as to function better in the domain of professional realiza-
tion. With the wider extent of the idea of justice permitted by the 
CA with respect to what Sen calls ‘Rawlsian institutional perfec-
tionism,’ we contend that the primacy of civil and political liberties 
would enter the workplace. It would consist in the freedom to pro-
fess one’s political beliefs and religious faith with the sole limitation 
of not making the exercise of others’ liberties impossible. Thus, we 
strongly maintain that the firm’s regulations should protect employ-
ees from any requirement to support the employer’s political opinions 
or to serve them. Democratic equality, as a sufficientarian criterion 
for just capabilities distribution (Anderson 1999), strongly militates 
against such an abusive transfer of administrative authority to the 
political subordination and control of employees by their employers. 
Concerning the capability to innovate one’s job creatively, we under-
stand it as employee entrepreneurship. The capabilities of individuals 
to innovate work processes creatively are conceivable as cooperating 
with others’ capabilities with which they are complementary. That 
is, they help to achieve interdependent functionings in the domain of 
professional realization, and moreover they may be functional to the 
production of goods and services that are preconditions for custom-
ers’ functionings. In fact, there is no reason to think that these capa-
bilities are exercised in isolation or, worse, that they entail mutually 
incompatible accomplishments. On the contrary, mutual advantage 
and super-additivity of team production can result from work organi-
zation understood in terms of complementary capabilities develop-
ment and conjoint functionings. However, we emphasize CG in this 
means of the presence of the community’s representatives on a cor-
porate supervisory board to which top managers report (under the 
dual governance model). In regard to the supply chain, suppliers may 
typically undertake specific investments (e.g., dedicated equipment 
and components, location-specific infrastructure, etc.). Large corpora-
tions can then exploit their suppliers’ dependence through the ex-post 
renegotiation of incomplete contracts. Suppliers’ well-being should 
then be promoted by the following capabilities/entitlements: (i) the 
negative claim not to be ex-ante excluded from a fair selection pro-
cess; (ii) the positive claim to receive all the information necessary 
to participate in the selection procedure, and about potential conflicts 
of interest; (iii) The negative claim that the firm should refrain from 
exploiting its bargaining power by threatening to exclude the supplier 
from the contract when it has idiosyncratically invested its resources 
in the supply relation. The responsibility of corporations toward cus-
tomers according to CA needs a more composite argument, to which 
we devote Appendix 3.
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Institutional Complementarities, 
and the Failure of Well‑Being and Justice
In this section, we consider Sen’s capabilities as a basic 
element of the constitutional and post-constitutional con-
tracts model including institutions located at different levels. 
This passage permits us to analyze the complementarity of 
institutions operating in different domains of society, with 
special reference to the negative repercussions that CG may 
have on social well-being if complementarity among these 
institutions does not work properly.23
The Paradox of Penelope’s Canvas
Institutions are complementary because they affect one 
another by mutually providing the strategic environment 
within which each institutional domain of interaction reaches 
its state of equilibrium (Aoki 2001). Such equilibrium states 
have well-being consequences for individuals operating in 
each domain that affect the achievement of an overall state 
of well-being. This complementarity can therefore be nor-
matively interpreted in terms of its effect on capabilities. 
Consider the role of a WS that grants initial endowments of 
primary goods and capabilities in pursuit of certain social 
justice goals concerning fairness in the distribution of well-
being (e.g., access to education, health services, access to 
credit for families and entrepreneurs, workers’ protection). 
At the same time, we have seen that firms also play an 
important role in creating and fostering certain opportunities 
relevant to justice. Firms distribute income and associated 
capabilities, such as being able to enjoy good health, being 
adequately fed, or having access to career opportunities. 
Moreover, by creating decent job opportunities, firms pro-
vide some basis for self-respect by making individuals able 
to be self-supporting, and by giving them the capability to 
participate actively in social life. Complementarity can then 
also be understood as the mutual effect that one institution 
operating in its domain has on the capabilities engendered 
by other institutions in their domain, and vice versa.
In this and the following section, we give a proof to the 
contrary of this statement by pointing out the failures due to 
malfunctioning institutional complementarity. This is what 
we call the ‘Paradox of Penelope’s canvas’: the work accom-
plished during the day by welfare institutions in forming 
capabilities, is unraveled during the night by market institu-
tions (like firms) which debar essential capabilities in the 
domain of CG. Specifically, firms are post-constitutional 
institutional domains wherein many capabilities in their de 
facto (skills) and de jure components (entitlements) have to 
be turned into functionings by corporate stakeholders. The 
WS provides many skills before the individual enters the 
firms’ domain, but without a constitutional design of the 
bundle of rights set in the firms’ domain, and specifically 
on CG, abuse of authority will continue to cause capabili-
ties deprivation. If the constitution fails to settle the entitle-
ment component of capabilities in the CG domain, abuse 
of authority will still prevail; then the skill component of 
capabilities will be nullified and fail to serve the achieve-
ment of well-being goals, dooming also the WS to failure.
Some elementary micro examples follow. Consider an 
environmental engineer that performs environmental impact 
analysis of many activities and projects of the company 
where s/he is employed. Her/his profession typically incor-
porates an internal standard of perfection that concerns pro-
tection of a public good—the environment. In the language 
of Sen’s theory, achieving such an internal standard means 
functioning well in the domain of professional activity. In 
order to achieve this functioning, the engineer needs a capa-
bility as skill, which s/he in fact possesses due to her/his 
high level of education and specialization as a scientist, but 
s/he also needs a capability as entitlement. That is to say that 
her/his environmental impact analyses will not be consist-
ent with such an internal standard of excellence if s/he is 
not entitled to the final say on the content of her/his reports. 
The governance structure of the company should not allow 
any hierarchical superordinate manager or director to impose 
changes and manipulations in the report data. Otherwise, 
the governance structure and the authority distribution in 
the firm would entail a capability deprivation of the envi-
ronmental engineer.
One can argue that satisficing the perfectionist ideal of a 
profession does not matter much in terms of basic function-
ings relevant to social justice. However, the argument can 
be straightforwardly extended: let us take the case of trained 
but not professional workers whose training is provided by 
the system of public schools. Their jobs allow them to earn 
enough income to support themselves and their families’ 
living standards (basic functionings) and also to participate 
actively in social and community life (also basic function-
ings). In order to maintain these basic functionings, however, 
essay, and the idea that the freedom to develop and exploit skills in 
order for the employees to function properly in joint production 
requires a legal infrastructure consisting in multiple privileges (per-
missions) and claim-rights. A central statement in this perspective 
is that property rights in the corporate domain need reform. Such 
reform would not permit the exclusion of employees from decision 
processes. Moreover, it would not allow their unilateral exclusion 
from access to corporate assets, to the extent that these are essential 
tools for the employees’ proper functionings. In so far as the discus-
sion of employees’ freedom is concerned, it seems that by arguing 
in favor of a quite substantial reform of corporate ownership and co-
determination in CG, we have gone a long way toward the ideal of 
individual self-determination and autonomy.
Footnote 22 (continued)
23 For an extensive analysis of institutional complementarity and the 
role of CG, see Aoki (2001, 2010).
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the employees must at least hold some monitoring rights, 
namely a capability—in the entitlement component—to 
check that the firm will continue to maintain their jobs, or 
to foresee organizational changes to which they will need to 
adapt or react preventively in order to avoid being arbitrarily 
fired. If these entitlements are lacking in the CG domain, 
their basic functionings are at risk. One can of course ask 
that the situation be repaired repeatedly by a new ex-post 
redistributive intervention of the WS. But because these 
skills are not paired with complementary capabilities as enti-
tlements, nothing can prevent them from failing repeatedly 
in their transformation into achieved functionings. Institu-
tions providing skills may continue to work during the day, 
but these capabilities do not achieve the required function-
ing because, during the night, the lack of complementary 
capabilities as entitlements in the CG domain makes them 
almost useless.
A Matter of Imperfect Design of the Constitutional 
and Post‑Constitutional Contracts
The effect of institutional complementarity between the 
WS and the firm can be better explained by referring to the 
interactions between constitutional and post-constitutional 
levels according to the two-stage bargaining model presented 
in Sect. “New-Institutional Economic Theory of the Firm 
and the Need for a Multi-stakeholder Governance Model.” 
Assume that the constitutional contract provides a WS that 
allocates primary goods and capabilities according to a 
needs-based criterion aimed at avoiding arbitrary inequali-
ties. The post-constitutional stage follows and parties can 
negotiate on the surplus’s distribution on the basis of their 
contribution within various specific productive coalitions. 
In the ideal case (‘ideal constitutional design’) at the second 
stage each equally rational individual offers her/his contri-
bution on the basis of previously granted primary goods 
and capabilities. Thus, final remuneration according to the 
contribution principle also reflects the individuals’ relative 
needs.
We now introduce a gap in the constitutional design. 
Assume that there is a post-constitutional negotiation within 
a corporation whose CG does not reflect any constraint con-
sistent with the agreement on principles of justice settled at 
the constitutional stage. Namely, the firm’s CG lacks pre-
cisely a proviso concerning equitable structures of rights 
and entitlements that would be complementary to the skills 
formed by other fundamental institutions (the WS). This 
gap allows abuse of authority to re-emerge. For example, at 
constitutional level, the individual is granted the freedom to 
have free or affordable high quality education, but s/he lacks 
recognition of certain rights that ensure that all participants 
have the same opportunities of access to positions of control 
or access to ownership of a firm’s resources, or have fair 
decision rights on the organization of a productive coalition 
(i.e., a firm). Alternatively, the constitution does not impose 
on a party in the position of an authority the extended 
responsibility to prevent any risk of abuse of authority by a 
responsible conduct or by redressing the disadvantaged par-
ties if abuse were to occur. This situation amounts to assum-
ing that the menu of constitutional choices at the first stage 
(the feasible constitutions) lacks exactly the fair structures of 
rights in the domain of CG. E.g., it is not possible for agents 
to form certain coalitions or to occupy the pivotal positions 
in the structure of possible coalitions. Alternatively, due to 
the absence of certain rights, some agent is never decisive 
in choosing the size of a coalition or in forming a winning 
coalition. Then the marginal contributions of this agent can-
not be decisive for the value of the coalition in which s/he 
is involved, and this sharply reduces the value that s/he can 
expect to obtain from participation in post-constitutional 
contracts (Shapley 1953; Sacconi 2006b). This will obvi-
ously depress the investments and hence the contributions 
of the non-controlling parties, while over-incentivizing that 
of the controlling parties. According to the ‘unilateral hier-
archical solution’ (see Sect. “New-Institutional Economic 
Theory of the Firm and the Need for a Multi-stakeholder 
Governance Model”), the result will be that the remuneration 
according to contribution will be suboptimal, since incen-
tives to invest also are sub-optimally protected. However, the 
perspective, which we take here, is that of justice: although 
the final distribution may reflect contributions, there is no 
correspondence with relative needs. The less protected par-
ties will contribute less, well below what they would do if 
the right and responsibility structure of the firm reflected 
relative needs. Therefore, the final distribution will never 
show consistency of the two justice principles as required by 
the constitutional and post-constitutional contracts theory, 
i.e., one party will never be able to ‘deserve what s/he really 
needs.’ To reach a final distribution that approximates the 
constitutional egalitarian distribution principle, recourse to 
ex-post redistributive transfers will be required. However, 
given the costs of ex-post transfers it is likely that the result 
will not be equally good, or even as feasible, as the one that 
would have been engendered by direct consistency between 
the constitutional and post-constitutional stages.
To summarize, we may rephrase the result in the terms of 
the CA: primary goods and capabilities, granted at consti-
tutional level, should shape the principles of CG so that at 
the post-constitutional level anyone’s functionings may be 
achieved in the corporate domain by exercising such capabil-
ities.24 In the absence of such a condition, post-constitutional 
24 At least those functionings promised as skill at the constitutional 
level or that require to satisfy the standard of ‘democratic equality’ 
also in the corporate sphere.
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contracts on the formation and management of various coop-
erative organizational forms would distort the process that 
from constitutional rights and capabilities leads to social 
outcomes. They would thus prevent the operation of these 
institutions from obtaining social outcomes satisficing the 
very idea of Sen’s well-being as functioning realization.
Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed an ‘Enlarged SC,’ an agree-
ment in the original position for the selection of principles 
for basic institutions of society (CG included), where institu-
tions are identified in terms not only of the primary goods 
that they provide but also of the capabilities that they form 
and uphold. We have argued that CG should be subject to 
the constitutional contract on basic institutions by means of a 
constitutional settlement of CG principles able to guarantee 
a balance between entitlements (capabilities) of the non-
owner and property rights of the owner. Owners should in 
fact have the right not to have their sphere of discretion vio-
lated, within the limits of the non-owner stakeholders’ rights 
to participate in decision-making processes, have relevant 
information, or be protected by extended fiduciary duties. 
The positive argument shows that once principles of CG are 
established, with the endowments of rights, individuals enter 
the post-constitutional stage in which they face opportunities 
of cooperation, and in exercising such rights, they invest in 
and contribute to the social surplus. At this point, a remu-
neration reflecting contributions and personal responsibility 
would be justified as far as it is consistent with entitlements 
that allow anyone to achieve well-being. Conversely, the 
negative argument in terms of malfunctioning institutional 
complementarities (Penelope’s canvas paradox) shows that a 
gap at the constitutional level, concerning principles of CG, 
would distort the complementarity of institutions in allow-
ing the achievement of individual functioning and finally 
social well-being.
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Appendix 1: Can the Normative Justification 
of the Stakeholder Approach be Utilitarian?
One may wonder whether preference utilitarianism (Har-
sanyi 1977a) may provide a logical foundation for stake-
holder theory given its solid rootedness in rational choice 
theory. In terms of rational choice models, what distin-
guishes utilitarianism from contractarianism? The latter 
formalizes the social contract as a multi-player strategic 
interaction—i.e., an ex-ante bargaining game under a 
veil of ignorance and an ex-post non-cooperative game 
of compliance, possibly affected by the ex-ante choice 
(Gauthier 1986; Binmore 2005; Sacconi 2006a, 2007, 
2011a, b; Sacconi and Faillo 2010). The former instead 
sees moral choice as an impartial but sympathetic indi-
vidual exercise of expected utility maximization, given 
a uniform probability distribution over all the possible 
personal and social positions that the decision maker can 
hypothetically occupy (Harsanyi 1977a). Even if these 
may seem innocuous preferences for choice models, they 
entail a significant difference with respect to the possi-
bility of making sense of the corporation as an artificial 
construct that enables cooperation of many stakeholders. 
Utilitarianism would not see stakeholders as moral agents 
involved in reciprocal cooperation and pursuing a corpo-
rate joint strategy and goal. Instead it would see them as 
moral recipients—i.e., all those receiving the effects of 
the utilitarian management of the firm. But what could 
then be the moral treatment of stakeholders according to 
a utilitarian management?
First, let us take an act-utilitarianism perspective (like 
the theories of Bentham, Mill, and Henry Sidgwick: see 
Lyons 1965). Since act utilitarianism aims at maximiz-
ing the sum of all the concerned sentient parties’ utili-
ties (or the average sentient party’s utility), utilitarian 
management would be involved in calculating every tiny 
and distant consequence of corporate action to whoever. 
These effects are not confined to stakeholders who have 
essential relations with a firm—like those who are locked-
in because of their specific investments, or dependent 
due to the firm’s monopsony position in the local labor 
market or supply chain, or the importance of negative or 
positive externality affecting them. Nor are they limited 
to those stakeholders who receive individually small but 
widespread and cumulatively important effects—like the 
single company contribution to global warming. Any tiny 
and sparse spillover effect of the corporate activities must 
be summed up as well. But a large global corporation 
may have a lot of these effects. Even more than in the 
case of national governments, a global corporation may 
have an indefinite number of ‘utilitarian stakeholders’ in 
the sense of subjects being affected by some tiny, distant 
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and sparse consequences of the corporate action, maybe 
transferred through international commerce. Calculating 
all such effects may go well beyond the bounds of manage-
ment rationality. This fact, in an act-utilitarian perspective, 
imposes serious limitations on managerial decisions, put-
ting them in a sort of Buridan’s Ass situation.
Even leaving aside this bounded rationality issue, how-
ever, a general remark seems to be necessary. Preference 
utilitarianism aims at maximizing the utility of a possibly 
non-existent ‘average individual’—or ‘average stakeholder.’ 
There is no relation between this perspective and that of 
concrete stakeholders as separate centers of choice, partici-
pating in the firm’s activity through ownership or contractual 
relationships, or receiving its immediate external effects and 
hence interacting through channels different than contracts 
(i.e., political action). Nevertheless, the cooperation amongst 
essential stakeholders is central for the functioning of the 
firm as a team production of goods and services, then dis-
tributed to the stakeholders’ mutual advantage. This is not 
to discredit the utilitarian perspective from a moral view-
point, but only to observe a descriptive mismatch between 
act utilitarianism and the institutional reality of the firm 
seen according to the stakeholder approach. Descriptively, 
if firms are cooperative ventures for mutual advantage, they 
need to be governed through corporate institutions at least 
accepted by those who have to cooperate with/in them. In 
general, this entails that they receive some accepted ben-
efits for cooperation or indemnity for negative effects on 
them. Morally speaking, however, utilitarians do not pay 
much attention to the benefits given to these cooperating 
stakeholders, since they have no moral priority against the 
consequentialist goal of maximizing the average individual’s 
utility.
Assume in fact that, by piecemeal analysis, we conclude 
that overall utility maximization would be better served by 
transforming paid employment into non-paid (or much less 
paid) free cooperation by volunteers and the firm into an 
NGO operating for some alternative social aim, benefitting 
groups of people who, given their social deprivation, have 
much more intense marginal utility variation from benefit 
with respect to the original corporate stakeholders (cus-
tomers included). What could prevent the company from 
undergoing this transformation? While instrumental argu-
ments could be considered (for example paid employment 
is needed if the same people or their relatives have to be 
capable of volunteering for some good cause), nothing of 
this would amount to an ethics inherent to the reality of the 
firm seen as stakeholders’ organized cooperation for their 
mutual advantage.
A step toward a rule-utilitarianism view (Brandt 1979; 
Harsanyi 1977a, b; Hardin 1988), setting a generalized 
stakeholder-oriented corporate management rule—which 
can be ratified as in general conductive to overall utility 
maximization—seems therefore to be required. Rule utili-
tarianism is well defined for market interaction under per-
fect competition. If one accepts the rough approximation for 
general utility maximization provided by Pareto optimality 
(when interpersonal utility comparisons are not available), 
profit maximization at the corporate level is the general rule 
ratified by utilitarianism. In fact, perfect competitive market 
equilibria are Pareto optimal, and reaching a market equi-
librium needs profit maximization at the firm level. But the 
very existence of corporations of non-null dimension in a 
world of incomplete contracts excludes that the economy is 
perfectly competitive.
Without perfect competition, however, there is no reason 
why utilitarianism should confine its moral justification to 
the profit maximization rule at the firm level. The demand 
for a generalized stakeholder-oriented management rule then 
surfaces as a true necessity. It could not be deduced from 
the simple observation of the conditions under which the 
economy reaches an equilibrium state (there are certainly 
market equilibria that do not maximize the social aggre-
gate of utilities). Hence, the stakeholder management rule 
that, if followed by all the companies, would contribute to 
maximizing general utility should be worked out by consid-
ering comparatively under any rule the social composition 
effects of combinations of stakeholders’ interests pursued 
at each corporate level. Then, what rule of stakeholders’ 
management at corporate level would lead to overall utility 
maximization?
One possibility is to assess from the utilitarian viewpoint 
the constitutional and post-constitutional contracts (i.e., 
rules) of the firm, which mainly involve stakeholders in the 
strict sense, assuming the minimization of the relevant nega-
tive externalities (see our second model considered in Sect. 
“(Partial) Constitutional and Post-constitutional Contracts,” 
and moreover Sacconi 2000, 2006b, 2011a). On the two-step 
view, companies run according to the micro-social contract 
amongst the involved stakeholders give each of them his/her 
Shapley value (his/her relative contribution to cooperation). 
Moreover, this must be a payoff obtained by operating within 
the limits of the fair constitution of the firm chosen at the 
constitutional contract level, which allocates basic resources, 
productive means, control rights and responsibilities accord-
ing to the relative need principle. Hence, the final distribu-
tion reached according to the best chosen constitution will 
satisfy—beyond the Shapley value within each constitu-
tion—also the Nash Bargaining Solution across all the pos-
sible constitutions. The Nash Bargaining Solution selects a 
point on the Pareto Efficient Frontier of the space including 
all the final allocations defined for all the possible constitu-
tions. Therefore satisfaction of the Paretian approximation 
of the utilitarian principle—acceptable when interpersonal 
utility comparisons are not available—also results under the 
two-step constitutional and post-constitutional view of the 
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firm. A rule utilitarian then would not be too much dissatis-
fied with the rules devised for the two-step social contract 
of the firm. Nevertheless, under interpersonal comparability 
of utility, normally Utilitarianism differs from and is less 
egalitarian than the Nash Bargaining Solution (see Brock 
1979; Rachmilevitch 2015).
An alternative view is the new-institutional theory of the 
firms’ ownership proposed by Hansmann (1986, 1996). It 
suggests that there is a natural utilitarian approach to adju-
dicating the most appropriate ownership form for each con-
text, once one assumes that “total wealth maximization” is a 
permissible approximation for the maximum general utility. 
In fact, for each case Hansmann selects the best (unilateral) 
ownership form (included the ‘no property’ rule instantiated 
by the no-profit organization) by comparing the aggregate 
transaction costs attached to any form (governance costs 
related to each allocation of ownership rights to a particular 
stakeholder plus contract costs still affecting the other stake-
holders under such a form) and minimizing across them.
This is a typical—even if simplified—utilitarian 
approach. The overall aggregate value of transaction costs 
(and hence total wealth) is accounted for, without paying 
much attention to how they are distributed. It is possible then 
that the best solution in a particular case allocates owner-
ship to a party that holds low governance costs, even if it 
induces significant contract costs for another party subject 
to the risk of abuse of authority. Hansmann, however, does 
not consider multi-stakeholder forms of governance. Hence, 
there is no room for reallocation of rights corresponding to 
the responsibility of the first party to minimize its abuse 
of the second party. But this raises the further objection of 
why should a stakeholder—undergoing the risk of abuse of 
authority—agree to enter voluntarily into any institutional 
form designed to provide the overall minimization of trans-
action costs, but not giving mutual or fair benefit to him/her. 
This in fact is the point where one recognizes the logical 
superiority of the social contract approach—making room 
for stakeholders as autonomous moral agents having sepa-
rate lives to be lived (partly, at least, in the company)—over 
the aggregative utilitarian view point.
Appendix 2: Why are Capabilities Better 
Than Resources to Make Sense of CG 
in the Light of Justice?
We replicate here, in the context of our analysis of the place 
held by CG in the TJ, the typical argument asserting the 
superiority of a capability metric over the primary good 
metric. That is, the CA considers the inequalities in func-
tionings actually achievable by different persons that may 
arise according to their interpersonal variations affecting 
capabilities, even if resources remain equal among them. 
Those variations can be: (a) in the environment faced by 
the agents, that may induce different levels of difficulty in 
accomplishing the same functioning given the same abilities; 
(b) in personal characteristics that, given the same physi-
cal environment, may constitute talents or handicaps in the 
performance of some functionings, e.g., by affecting the 
capability to bear effort or attention needed for performing a 
task; (c) in the treatment that prevailing social norms reserve 
to persons, given the same environment and similar abili-
ties, in terms of social approbation, stigma or discrimination 
for example against categories of persons who attempt to 
function in certain activities, e.g., women seeking success 
in professions traditionally reserved to men. Notwithstand-
ing the same level of resources, these variations may induce 
dramatic inequalities in the capabilities to achieve relevant 
functionings.
Suppose now that the constitution provides for the egali-
tarian distribution of a limited series of primary social goods 
that, according to the literal reading of Rawls’ theory, does 
not include multi-stakeholder rights in the sphere of CG 
(like democratization or participation rights in corporate 
control). Assume also that these goods are employed to 
provide people with capabilities as skills through publicly 
funded education institutions. Then, given the same skills 
based on the same share of primary goods, major inequali-
ties in the opportunity that agents have to achieve significant 
functionings may still occur due to the above mentioned var-
iations. Specifically, let us first admit that variations are (a′) 
in the ‘institutional environment,’ rather than in the physical 
environment, that is, the legal ordering within which agents 
choose to exploit their opportunities to function. Hence, let 
agent X operate in a legal environment such that all goods 
beyond the primary ones are privately owned by someone 
else, so that for each good there is a valid claim against 
X to keep him/her out of it. And let on the contrary agent 
Y operate in a different legal environment, wherein there 
are many commons (i.e., public infrastructures) that Y has 
therefore the privilege to enter and to use for developing 
plans and achieving a good level of functionings. Undoubt-
edly, in the second environment agent Y disposes of many 
more opportunities than agent X in the first environment 
does. Secondly, admit that variation are (b′) in personal 
characteristics given the same legal environment and the 
same basic resources (devoted to education) and skills. Two 
individuals X and Y exhibit different personal characteris-
tics, such as family names and their belonging to different 
family groups. The legal ordering however associates these 
characteristics to relevant legal relations and entitlements 
such as substantial ownership of significant hereditary finan-
cial wealth invested in corporate assets for X and no owner-
ship at all for Y. Thus, some personal characteristics may 
count as a fortune for someone or a misfortune (a handicap) 
for someone else. Although they have the same skills and 
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ability from education and training, the opportunity of the 
capital owner’s son X to access the summit of a company he 
partly owns is wider than the opportunity to function in an 
entrepreneurial activity for Y—she will more probably be 
subjected to hierarchical power in an organization notwith-
standing her good skills. Hence, these persons hold signifi-
cantly different capabilities in terms of freedom to access 
and use wealth in order to undertake plans in which they 
may try to function and in terms of protection of this free-
dom by means of rights excluding anybody else from wealth. 
Thirdly, admit that variation are (c′) in treatment that pre-
vailing social norms reserve to persons, even though skills 
are similar, there is equal control over basic resources, and 
substantial similarity in privately owned wealth. Hence let 
two agents X and Y live under a social norm system express-
ing strong social approbation for the conservation of family 
control over private companies. A social norm of nepotism 
may then support discrimination in internal careers. The son 
of a company owner (X) is then socially approbated when 
he early accedes to a managerial position within the family 
company, while the same would be seen as inappropriate in 
the case of Y, having similar skills but no family relations 
with the owner. The skilled Y with no family connection 
with the company owner may even adapt her preference to 
these social norms, forgoing the aspiration to reach such 
positions, and possibly migrating to find fortune elsewhere.
Obviously, there is no necessity that all the capabilities 
inequalities instantiated by (a′), (b′) and (c′) are indefinitely 
compensated (this would be liable to attack on the grounds 
of Pogge’s critique—see Sect. “Capabilities and Primary 
Goods,” p. 27). However we may ground the selection of 
a level of compensation for some of these capability ine-
qualities on a sufficientarian rule, i.e., the satisfaction of a 
capability threshold only sufficient to the exercise of demo-
cratic equality (Anderson 2010) and which is independent 
of the possibility to carry out a complete social ordering of 
all the possible capabilities. We only need now to extend 
democratic citizenship to include the democratization of 
authority in workplaces and the multi-stakeholder socially 
responsible models of CG. Anderson herself suggests (even 
if implicitly) this extension in her recent book on private 
government (Anderson 2017). Contemporary large corpora-
tions are ‘private governments’ wherein employers exercise 
systematic and penetrating authority over important spheres 
of the employees’ lives, from labor organization and wealth 
distribution to lifestyle. Such authority is based—thanks to 
regimes of dismissal freedom increasingly introduced by 
many national governments—on the continuous threat to 
exclude the employee from the company, and hence from 
the resources that s/he needs for material subsistence and 
pursuit of any life plan. Under private governments there 
is neither accountability to the non-controlling stakehold-
ers for this exercise of power, nor fiduciary commitment to 
exercise authority in the reciprocal interest of all the corpo-
rate stakeholders, especially those who invest idiosyncrati-
cally and hence face high costs for the exit option. Besides 
lacking significant exit options, employees also lack voice 
to protect themselves from abuse of authority within private 
governments.
Anderson, with an argument similar to ours on abuse of 
authority, does not deny the efficiency rationale for large 
corporations, but suggests that the unconstrained political 
power exercised by private actors is a form of domination 
and status inequality among persons occupying different 
layers in the corporate hierarchy. Inequality of status and 
domination, however, are the hallmarks of political (even if 
private) regimes opposing democratic equality. Anderson 
concludes that, in order to democratize private governments, 
not only should the exit options be strengthened but also 
constitutional freedom rights within the corporate domain 
should be enforced, and especially forms of democracy in 
the workplace e.g., through the introduction in America of 
the co-determination model (Anderson 2017, p. 142).
It is therefore not difficult to join the two sides of Ander-
son’s inquiry (i.e., democratic equality and private gov-
ernments) by concluding that the threshold of capabilities 
(as entitlements) that should be satisfied in order to grant 
democratic equality would include more employees’ free-
dom in the workplace, more participation in work organiza-
tion and employment condition decisions, protected by the 
claim-right of having a voice in the decision process, and 
supported by further claim-rights preventing exclusion at 
will from the company by arbitrary dismissal. We simply 
suggest that the agreement under the veil of ignorance on 
the constitutions of the firm converging on the symmetrical 
solution of ex-ante bargaining would allocate to stakehold-
ers, and especially employees, the participation, information 
and protection rights against arbitrary dismissal that would 
substantially counterbalance the authority of shareholders, 
directors and top management. Such balanced entitlements 
would induce much less inequality in the distribution of the 
corporate surplus amongst stakeholders, and hence a more 
egalitarian distribution of the opportunity to pursue the 
achievement of any significant functionings. Recall, how-
ever, that such enhancement of employees’ functionings 
would not be arbitrary and indefinite, as it corresponds to 
the unanimous social contract on the constitution of the firm.
Appendix 3: The Obligations of Justice That 
Corporations Owe to Their Customers
The CA also offers a new perspective on the obligations of 
justice that a corporation owes to its customers and clients. 
Instead of focusing on goods as tools for extrinsic desire-
satisfaction (welfare), the CA emphasizes functionings and 
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capabilities as the objective bases of customers’ well-being. 
This eudemonic trait (see Sen 2017, p. 356) has dramatic 
implications:
a) Adequacy of goods (characteristics) to logically pos-
sible functionings. What the firm supplies to customers are 
not goods but goods’ characteristics. These, under the proper 
choice of some (at least) logically possible transformation 
function, should enable the customer to achieve a signifi-
cant level of functioning in a given domain of her/his life—
whatever the ‘functioning’ may be. Hence the subjective 
satisfaction of a desire that does not correspond (i.e., is not 
adequate) to any real achievable functioning should not be 
the goal of the firm/customer transaction.
b) Supporting the customer’s capability formation. A 
good’s characteristics cannot be transformed into any rea-
sonable level of functioning if the relevant transformation 
function does not belong to the customer’s capabilities set. 
Lacking such transformation function, the good would be 
useless with respect to the customer’s well-being. Hence, it 
is the responsibility of the firm that supplies the good also 
to provide the information and education of the correspond-
ing capabilities. Or, at least, not to sell to a client a good 
or service which s/he is known not to have the capability 
to transform in a proper functioning. In other words: “you 
shall sell to a customer only goods he/she has the capability 
to employ for his /her functionings.”
c) Supporting the customer’s freedom of choice. The 
well-being value of any consumption act is not associated 
only with the adequacy of the good’s characteristics to avail-
able capabilities. It also depends on the free choice of that 
functioning within a set of multiple individual capabilities. 
Hence, supporting the consumer’s capabilities must not 
be confined to the sole utilization function that entails the 
customer will buy the good. Instead, it should put a larger 
array of alternative capabilities at the customer’s disposal, 
in order to allow her/him to decide how to function with the 
goods available in the market. In other words, the support 
of the customer’s capabilities must not induce him/her to 
depend idiosyncratically—given her/his restricted capabil-
ity set—on the single set of characteristics possessed by an 
item provided by a specific company. This would not count 
as support of the customer’s freedom, but as a path to his/
her dependence on a specific supplier firm. Moreover, it is 
the responsibility of the company not to limit the customer’s 
freedom of choice by imposing a pre-established model of 
consumption that may discourage the client from looking 
at different modes of use of certain goods. For example, 
by means of advertisement that propagates stigma for con-
sumers who do not follow the fashion in their consumption 
model.
d) Do not exploit idiosyncratic customers’ capabilities. 
The formation of capabilities may nonetheless require spe-
cific investments by the client, who spends effort on learning 
and on the development of specific skills related to the use 
of particular characteristics. By necessity, this may create 
idiosyncratic relations between the two parties (customer 
and supplier) aimed at the subsequent supply of certain char-
acteristics corresponding to the developed skills of the cus-
tomer. Such idiosyncratic relations should not be exploited 
by the firm for the purpose of expropriating the customer of 
so much value as to compromise his/her well-being. That 
is, after the customer’s investment, the supplier by ex-post 
renegotiation should not set the price of the transaction so 
high that completing the transaction would put the customer 
(due to the opportunity-costs borne in terms of alternative 
functionings) in the position of achieving an overall func-
tioning level (well-being) lower than what he/she would have 
been able to achieve if s/he had not invested in that particular 
capability.
e) Enough supply to satisfy sufficient provisions of goods 
functional to the equal achievement of basic functionings at 
affordable prices for all. If basic functionings are involved 
in the customer/firm relations—such as having a decent level 
of nutrition, housing, health, education, mobility etc.—suf-
ficient quantities of the corresponding goods’ characteristics 
must be offered at prices under a given threshold, so that suf-
ficient provisions of the characteristics necessary for equal 
capabilities in these basic functionings are affordable for all. 
Affordability for all of equal, sufficient quantities entails that 
any person is entitled (i.e., has the capability to access) to 
the characteristics needed to function (being well or doing 
well) in these basic fields of human life.
Admittedly, the four former responsibilities can be satis-
fied through the acknowledgement of entitlements to cus-
tomers that consist in claims addressed to particular goods 
suppliers. But this is not true for the latter. It identifies an 
imperfect right for which there is no claim addressed to a 
single or precise provider of the good—unless the good is 
supplied under a monopoly regime. The claim is instead 
addressed collectively to all the members of an industry 
operating in the supply of certain goods in a geographical 
location, with reference to the relevant group of customers 
(village, region, nation etc.). As a whole, they are subject to 
the social responsibility of providing sufficient amounts of 
the goods at prices not above a given threshold, so that each 
individual may access an equal, sufficient level of each basic 
functioning. This of course may require public regulation of 
these industries, direct public provision of some services, 
or organization of these industries by means of non-profit 
enterprises.
As said, on the contrary, the previous four responsibili-
ties identify customers’ entitlements that may be construed 
as Hohfeld legal relations (Hohfeld 1917): (i) the positive 
claim-right that the goods supplied (especially under asym-
metry of information on quality) contain the characteris-
tics that customers may de facto transform into substantial 
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levels of functioning; (ii) the positive claim-right of receiv-
ing the information and education necessary to develop the 
skills that allow customers to transform supplied goods into 
functionings, and moreover to generate a rich capability set 
within which the customer may freely choose; (iii) the nega-
tive claim-right not to be subjected to deceptive advertis-
ing aimed at activating unreflective ‘frames of mind’ under 
which models of consumption different from the only one 
mostly conducive to the seller’s interests are stigmatized. 
Finally, consider the case of an idiosyncratic capability 
developed under the expectation that some goods will be 
normally provided at prices that make the intent to use them 
for functioning entirely reasonable in terms of its oppor-
tunity-costs (other functioning renounced). This situation 
entails (iv) the negative claim-right that the idiosyncratic 
customer’s capability shall be not ex-post exploited by the 
good’s supplier by imposing a price that would expropriate 
the customer’s well-being. In other words, the right not to 
be excluded from accessing the required characteristics at a 
price such that the customer avoids the situation that had s/
he been informed about actual price conditions, s/he ex-ante 
would not have decided to invest in developing the capability 
under consideration.
References
Alchian, A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, 
and economic organization. The American Economic Review, 
62(5), 777–795.
Anderson, E. (1999). What is the point of equality? Ethics, 109(2), 
287–337.
Anderson, E. (2010). Justifying the capability approach to justice. In 
H. Brighouse & I. Robeyns (Eds.), Measuring justice: Primary 
goods and capabilities (pp. 81–100). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Anderson, E. (2015). Equality and freedom in the workplace: Recov-
ering republican insights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 31(2), 
48–69.
Anderson, E. (2017). Private government: How employers rule our 
lives (and why we don’t talk about it), Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Aoki, M. (1984). The co-operative game theory of the firm. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Aoki, M. (2001). Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Aoki, M. (2010). Corporations in evolving diversity: Cognition, gov-
ernance, and institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arneson, R. (2010). Two cheers for capabilities. In H. Brighouse & I. 
Robeyns (Eds.), Measuring justice: Primary goods and capa-
bilities (pp. 101–128). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Arnold, D. G. (2013). Global justice and international business. Busi-
ness Ethics Quarterly, 23(01), 25–143.
Arrow, K. J. (1974). The limits of organization. New York: WW Norton 
& Company.
Basu, K., & Kanbur, R.(Eds.). (2009). Arguments for a better world: 
Essays for Amartya Sen’s 75th birthday. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Bertland, A. (2009). Virtue ethics in business and the capabilities 
approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 84, 25–32.
Binmore, K. (1989). Social contract. I: Harsanyi and Rawls. The Eco-
nomic Journal, 99(395), 84–102.
Binmore, K. (1998). Game theory and the social contract, Volume 2: 
Just playing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Binmore, K. (2005). Natural justice. Oxford: Oxford University press.
Bishop, J. D. (2008). For-profit corporations in a just society: A social 
contract argument concerning the rights and responsibilities of 
corporations. Business Ethics Quarterly, 18(2), 191–212.
Blair, M., & Stout, L. A. (1999). A team production theory of corporate 
law. Virginia Law Review, 85(2), 247–331.
Blanc, S. (2016). Are Rawlsian considerations of corporate govern-
ance illiberal? A reply to singer. Business Ethics Quarterly 26(3), 
125–143.
Blanc, S., & Al-Amoudi, I. (2013). Corporate institutions in a weak-
ened welfare state: A Rawlsian perspective. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 230(4), 497–525.
Brandt, R. B. (1979). A theory of the good and the right. Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press.
Brighouse, H., & Robeyns, I. (Eds.). (2010). Measuring justice: pri-
mary goods and capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Brock, H. (1979). A game theoretic account of social justice. In H. 
Brock (Ed.), Game theory, social choice and ethics. Dordrecht: 
Springer.
Buchanan, J. (1975). The limits of liberty. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 
386–405.
Deakin, S. (2006). ‘Capacitas’: Contract law and the institutional pre-
conditions of a market economy. European Review of Contract 
Law, 2(3), 317 – 34.
Deakin, S. (2009). The ‘capability’ concept and the evolution of Euro-
pean social policy. New Zealand Journal of Employment Rela-
tions, 34(1), 7–26.
Del Punta, R. (2015). Labour law and the capability approach. Inter-
national Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations, 32(4), 383–406.
Donaldson, T. (1982). Corporations and morality. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. (1994). Toward a unified conception 
of business ethics: Integrative social contracts theory. Academy 
of management review, 19(2), 252–284.
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. (1995). Integrative social contracts 
theory: A communitarian conception of economic ethics. Eco-
nomics and Philosophy, 11, 85–112.
Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the 
corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of 
Management Review, 20(1), 65–91.
Francés-Gómez, P. (2003). Some difficulties in Sacconi’s view about 
corporate ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 42(2), 165–180.
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. 
Boston: Pitman.
Freeman, R. E., & Evan, W. M. (1993). Stakeholder management and 
the modern corporation: kantian capitalism. In Beauchamp, T., & 
Bowie, N. (Eds.) Ethical theory and business (3rd edn.). Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Freeman, R. E., Harrison, J. S., Wicks, A. C., Parmar, B. L., & 
DeColle, S. (2010). Stakeholder theory: The state of the art. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Freeman, S. (2007). Rawls. Milton Park: Routledge.
Garriga, E. (2014). Beyond stakeholder utility function: Stakeholder 
capability in the value creation process. Journal of Business Eth-
ics, 120(4), 489–507.
Gauthier, D. (1986). Morals by agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Justice and Corporate Governance: New Insights from Rawlsian Social Contract and Sen’s…
1 3
Gelter, M. (2009). The dark side of shareholder influence: Mana-
gerial autonomy and stakeholder: Orientation in comparative 
corporate governance. Harvard International Law Journal, 
50(1), 129–134.
Giovanola, B. (2009). Re-thinking the anthropological and ethical 
foundation of economics and business: Human richness and 
capabilities enhancement. Journal of Business Ethics, 88(3), 
431–444.
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. (1986). The costs and benefit of owner-
ship: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(4), 691–719.
Hansmann, H. (1988). Ownership of the firm. Journal of Law Eco-
nomics and Organisation, 4(2), 263–304.
Hansmann, H. (1996). The ownership of the enterprise. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Hardin, R. (1988). Morality within the limits of rationality. London: 
Chicago University press.
Hart, O. (1995). Firms, contract and financial structure. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Harsanryi, J. C. (1977b). Rule utilitarianism and decision theory. 
Erkenntnis, 11, 25–53.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1977a). Rational behaviour and bargaining equilib-
rium in games and social situations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990). Property rights and the nature of the 
firm. Journal of political economy, 98(6), 1119–1158.
Heath, J., Moriarty, J., & Norman, W. (2010). Business ethics and 
(or as) political philosophy. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(03), 
427–452.
Heugens, P. P., van Oosterhout, J. H., & Kaptein, M. (2006). Founda-
tions and applications for contractualist business ethics. Jour-
nal of Business Ethics, 68(3), 211–228.
Hiller, J. S. (2013). The benefit corporation and corporate social 
responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 118(2), 287–301.
Hohfeld, W. N. (1917). Fundamental legal conceptions as applied 
in judicial reasoning. Faculty Scholarship Series, paper 4378.
Hsieh, N. (2005). Rawlsian justice and workplace republicanism. 
Social Theory and Practice, 31(1), 115–142.
Hsieh, N. (2008). Survey article: Justice in production. Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 16(1), 72–100.
Hsieh, N. (2009). The normative study of business organizations: A 
Rawlsian approach. In J. Smith (Ed.), Normative theory and 
business ethics (pp. 93–117). New York: Rowan and Littlefield.
Jensen, M. C. (2001). Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and 
the corporate objective function. Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 14(3), 8–21.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Mana-
gerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal 
of financial economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Kalfagianni, A. (2014). Addressing the global sustainability chal-
lenge: The potential and pitfalls of private governance from the 
perspective of human capabilities. Journal of business ethics, 
122(2), 307–320.
Kaplow, L., & Shavell, S. (2009). Fairness versus welfare. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Keeley, M. (1988). A social contract theory of organizations. Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Keeley, M. (1995). Continuing the social contract tradition. Business 
Ethics Quarterly, 5(2), 241–255.
Kelly, E. (2010). Equal opportunity, unequal capability. In H. Brig-
house & I. Robeyns (Eds.), Measuring justice: Primary goods 
and capabilities (pp. 61–80). Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Lancaster, K. (1979). Variety, Equity and Efficiency. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press.
Leader, S. (1999). Participation and property rights. Journal of Busi-
ness Ethics, 21(2–3), 97–109.
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention. A philosophical study. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Lyons, D. (1965). Forms and limits of utilitarianism. Oxford: Clar-
endon Press.
MacIntyre, A. (1984). After virtue: A study in moral theory (2nd edn.). 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Mansell, S. F. (2013). Capitalism, corporations and the social contract. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mansell, S. F. (2015). Book review: rejoinder to Veldman’s review of 
capitalism, corporations and the social contract: A critique of 
stakeholder theory. Sage UK: London, England.
Marcoux, A. M. (2003). A fiduciary argument against stakeholder 
theory. Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(1), 1–24.
Merrill, T. W., & Smith, H. E. (2001). What happened to property in 
law and economics? The Yale Law Journal, 111(2), 357–398.
Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18(2), 
155–162.
Néron, P. Y. (2010). Business and the polis: What does it mean to 
see corporations as political actors? Journal of Business Ethics, 
94(3), 333–352.
Norman, W. (2015). Rawls on markets and corporate governance. Busi-
ness Ethics Quarterly, 25(01), 29–64.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating capabilities. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
O’Neill, M. (2009). Liberty, equality and property-owning democracy. 
Journal of Social Philosophy, 40(3), 379–396.
Pogge, T. (2002). Can the capability approach be justified? Philosophi-
cal Topics, 30(2), 167–228.
Pogge, T. (2010). A critique of the capability approach. In H. Brig-
house & I. Robeyns (Eds.), Measuring justice: Primary goods 
and capabilities (pp. 17–60). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Posner, E. A. (1997). Standards, rules, and social norms. Harvard Jour-
nal of Law and Public Policy 21(101).
Rachmilevitch, S. (2015). The Nash solution is more utilitarian than 
egalitarian. Theory and Decision, 79(3), 463–478.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Rawls, J. (1980). Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory. The Journal 
of Philosophy, 77(9), 515–572.
Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Renouard, C. (2011). Corporate social responsibility, utilitarianism, 
and the capabilities approach. Journal of business ethics, 98(1), 
85–97.
Sacchetti, S. (2015). Inclusive and exclusive social preferences: A 
Deweyan framework to explain governance heterogeneity. Jour-
nal of Business Ethics, 126(3), 473–485.
Sacconi, L. (1999). Codes of ethics as contractarian constraint on the 
abuse of authority within hierarchies: A perspective from the 
theory of the firm. Journal of Business Ethics, 21(2–3), 189–202.
Sacconi, L. (2000). The social contract of the firm economics, ethics 
and organization. Berlin: Springer.
Sacconi, L. (2006a). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a model 
of extended corporate governance, an explanation based on the 
economic theory of social contract, reputation and reciprocal 
conformism. in F. Cafaggi (Ed.), Reframing self-regulation in 
European private Law, Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer academic, 
289–341, downloadable as Liuc paper 142 (2004) https ://paper 
s.ssrn.com/sol3/paper s.cfm?abstr act_id=51452 2.
Sacconi, L. (2006b). A social contract account for CSR as extended 
model of corporate governance (Part I): Rational bargaining and 
justification. Journal of Business Ethics, 68(3), 259–281.
 M. Fia, L. Sacconi 
1 3
Sacconi, L. (2007). A social contract account for CSR as extended 
model of corporate governance (Part II): Compliance, reputation 
and reciprocity. Journal of Business Ethics, 75(1), 77–96.
Sacconi, L. (2011a). A Rawlsian view of CSR and the game theory 
of its implementation (part i): The multi-stakeholder model of 
corporate governance. In L. Sacconi, M. Blair, R. E. Freeman & 
A. Vercelli (Eds.) ‘Corporate social responsibility and corporate 
governance: The contribution of economic theory and related 
disciplines’. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Sacconi, L. (2011b). A Rawlsian view of CSR and the game theory 
of its implementation (Part II): Fairness and equilibrium. In L. 
Sacconi, M. Blair, R. E. Freeman & A. Vercelli (Eds.), Corporate 
social responsibility and corporate governance: The contribu-
tion of economic theory and related disciplines. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Sacconi, L. (2013). Ethics, economic organisation and the social con-
tract. In A. Grandori (Ed.), Handbook of economic organization: 
Integrating economic and organization theory (pp. 112–136). 
MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Northampton.
Sacconi, L., & Faillo, M. (2010). Conformity, reciprocity and the sense 
of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs 
explain norm compliance: The experimental evidence. Consti-
tutional Political Economy, 21(2), 171–201.
Sen, A. (1980). Equality of what? In S. McMurrin (Ed.), Tanner lec-
tures on human values. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sen, A. (1981). Poverty and Famines. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (1992). Inequality reexamined. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Sen, A. (1998). On economic inequality. Oxford: Oxford University 
press, Oxford.
Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Oxford.
Sen, A. (2010). The place of capability in a theory of justice. In H. 
Brighouse & I. Robeyns (Eds.), Measuring justice: primary 
goods and capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 239–253.
Sen, A. (2017). Collective choice and social welfare: Expanded edition. 
London: Penguin Books.
Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. Kuhn, & A. 
Tucker (Eds.) Contributions to the theory of games. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Shrivastava, S., & Selvarajah, C. (2016). Organisational justice: A 
Senian perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 135(1), 99–116.
Simon, H. A. (1951). A formal theory of the employment relationship. 
Econometrica, 19, 293–305.
Singer, A. (2015). There is no Rawlsian theory of corporate govern-
ance. Business Ethics Quarterly, 25(1), 65–92.
Singer, A. (2016). Justice failure: Efficiency and equality in business 
ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 28, 1–19.
Stout, L. (2012). The shareholder value myth. San Francisco: Berrett-
Koehler Publishers, Inc.
Sumner, L. (1987). The moral foundations of rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Taylor, R. S. (2004). Self-realization and the priority of fair equality of 
opportunity. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 1(3), 333–347.
Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1977). The emergence of norms. Oxford: Clar-
endon Press.
Westermann-Behaylo, M. K., Van Buren, H. J., & Berman, S. L. 
(2016). Stakeholder capability enhancement as a path to pro-
mote human dignity and cooperative advantage. Business Ethics 
Quarterly 26(4), 166–178.
Williamson, O. (1975). Market and hierarchies. New York, NY: The 
Free Press.
Williamson, O. (1986). The economic institutions of capitalism. New 
York, NY: The Free Press.
Young, H. P. (1998). Individual strategy and social structure, an evo-
lutionary theory of social institutions. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
